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Plaintiff/ Appellee Patrick Liley ("Liley"), by through his counsel, respectfully 
submits this Appellee's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-
103(2)G). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b )( 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Liley disagrees 
with Cedar Springs Ranch, Inc. 's (the "CSR") Statement of the issues on appeal and the 
standards ofreview. Liley submits that the statements of the issues and standards ofreview 
set forth below are what should govern CSR's appeal. 
ISSUE 1: CSR asserts that the trial court "essentially" ruled as a matter of law that 
a landlord possesses the cows grazing on the landlord's land for purposes of UTAH CODE 
ANN.§ 41-6a-407(l)(a) (the "Safety Law"). The trial court made no such ruling. The trial 
court found that evidence existed to suggest that CSR had "some duty to control the actions 
of its tenant," and the trial court opined that CSR's duty could be impacted by the fact CSR 
and tenant Warm Creek Ranch, Inc. ("WCR") are both owned and controlled by Dale 
Darius. The trial court therefore denied summary judgment on the question of duty and 
allowed trial to proceed on the question of the scope of CSR's duty versus WCR's duty. 
After Liley presented his case-in-chief at trial, the trial court then found there was sufficient 
evidence to support a finding that CSR was at fault to put the question to the jury, and the 
trial court explicitly noted that CSR intended to allocate fault to WCR for the cow being 
on the highway. The trial court stated, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I do find that a landlord does have some duty to control the actions of its 
tenant, and I would say that at least in this case I would think that duty 
perhaps is slightly greater given the close interrelationship of the parties. 
And so unlike the directed verdict for UDOT, I am going to find that there 
is sufficient competent evidence to go to the iury on the issue of 
negligence with regard to Cedar Springs Ranch. And I note in making this 
decision that there's already been an indication of an intent to allocate fault 
to Warm Springs which Cedar Springs still has available to it in this action. 
And so I'm going to deny the motion for the directed verdict, and we'll move 
forward on that basis. 
R. 1310:23-1311:12 (emphasis supplied). This ruling by the trial court demonstrates that 
the Court did not rule on the scope of CSR's duty. The trial court left the question open 
for the parties to litigate at trial. Consequently, whether CSR had a duty to control the 
cattle sufficient to trigger liability under the Safety Law was a question of fact for the jury. 
Rahofy v. Steadman, 2012 UT 70, ,r 21 (possession or control of medical records is 
ultimately a question of fact); State v. Bowen, 143 P. 134, 135 (Utah 1914) {what 
constitutes recent possession of a cow is a question of fact). 
Among the evidence that the jury had to consider in deciding that question was 
whether to believe the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of Dorius that an oral 
agreement regarding fence maintenance had been adopted over 40 years earlier, and 
whether any fence maintenance agreement between CSR and WCR (both of which were 
controlled by Dorius) was so comprehensive that it relieved CSR of any duty to maintain 
its fences during the eight months of the year that WCR was not in residence on the 
property. The testimonial and photographic evidence introduced at trial established that 
the fence was full of holes big enough for cattle to pass through and those holes and the 
general disrepair of the fence had been in existence far longer than W CR' s most recent 
2 
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tenancy. This evidence of fencing negligence that predates WCR's tenancy at the time of 
the collision was particularly germane given that the Stephenson v. Warner case that CSR 
relies upon states that a tenant's liability for a dangerous condition on leased property only 
extends to conditions that were created by tenant or allowed to occur by the tenant during 
the tenancy. 581 P.2d 567, 568-569 (Utah 1978). 
Liley submits that CSR's Issue No. 1 should state: Did the trial court correctly find 
that sufficient evidence was presented to allow a jury to determine whether CSR was at 
fault to any degree for failing to ensure that its own fencing was adequately maintained 
year to year to prevent cows from entering the highway when cows were on the property? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Because CSR challenges the trial court's summary 
judgment and directed verdict rulings, two separate standards are applicable. 
As to summary judgment, appellate courts normally review a grant or denial of a 
motion for summary judgment '"in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."' 
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ,r 31 ( quoting Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. 
Co., 819 P.2d 803, 803 (Utah 1991)). But when a motion for summary judgment is denied 
due to the presence of factual issues and a trial then takes place, appellate courts will forego 
any review the summary judgment ruling. Kerr v. Salt Lake City, 2013 UT 75, ,r ,r 11, 29. 
See also Hone v. Advanced Shoring & Underpinning, Inc., 2012 UT App 327, ,r 6. 
With regard to the trial court's denial of a directed verdict, the standard of review is 
more deferential to the trial court than CSR portrays. The standard of review is as follows: 
When an appellant challenges the denial of a motion for directed verdict 
based upon the sufficiency of the evidence, 'the applicable standard of 
review is highly deferential.' • A defendant must overcome a substantial 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
burden on appeal to show that the trial court erred in denying a motion for 
directed verdict.' 
State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ,r 32 (first quoting State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r 30; 
then quoting Gonzalez v. State, 2015 UT 10, ,r 27) (emphasis supplied). A more detailed 
description of that standard of review reads: 
Under Utah law, a party who moves for a directed verdict has the very 
difficult burden of showing that no evidence exists that raises a question of 
material fact. If there is any evidence raising a question of material fact, 
judgment as a matter oflaw is improper. Thus, a motion for a directed verdict 
is only appropriate when the court is able to conclude, as a matter oflaw, that 
reasonable minds would not differ on the facts to be determined from the 
evidence presented. When considering a motion for a directed verdict, the 
trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party 
moved against; however, the court is not free to weigh the evidence and thus 
invade the province of the jury, whose prerogative it is to judge the facts. 
Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ,r 18 (first .emphasis in original, internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
ISSUE 2: CSR attempts to portray the trial court's comments on the question of 
duty as somehow constituting a ruling that CSR and WCR were alter egos of one another 
and that CSR owed a heightened duty as a result. In reality, the trial court was very careful 
to avoid ruling on the relationship between CSR and WCR. What the trial court said was: 
In making this ruling, I want to make clear that in no way is my ruling 
intended to address any breach of piercing the corporate veil. I understand 
the difference of the different corporations that are at issue here, although I'm 
hesitant to even try to say the names because I'm sure I would get warm and 
cedar and springs and creek mixed up. I certainly do understand the 
distinction between those. However, the difference here is that while they 
are distinct legal entities, Mr. Darius is a principal in both. There is a 
landlord/tenant relationship based upon his own testimony, and I do find that 
a landlord does have some duty to control the actions of its tenant, and I 
would say that at least in this case I would think that duty perhaps is slightly 
greater given the close interrelationship of the parties. 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
R. 1310:10-1311:2. Given that the trial court's actual ruling contradicts CSR's statement 
of Issue No. 2, the correct statement of Issue No. 2 should read: Did the district court err 
by finding that the question of CSR's duty to ensure that cattle on its property were properly 
fenced involved questions of fact for the jury to decide? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Because CSR challenges the trial court's summary 
judgment and directed verdict rulings, two separate standards are applicable. 
Appellate courts review a grant or denial of a motion for summary "'in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party."' Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ,r 
31 (quoting Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803, 803 (Utah 1991)). When a 
trial court denies a motion for summary judgment, and a trial follows, appellate courts may 
only review a trial court's denial of summary judgment for correctness when that decision 
is based upon a purely legal basis. Kerr v. Salt Lake City, 2013 UT 75, ,r 111, 29. There 
is no appellate review if the denial of a motion for summary judgment is based on the 
existence of an issue of material fact and followed by a trial. See also Hone v. Advanced 
Shoring & Underpinning, Inc., 2012 UT App 327, 16. 
With regard to the standard of review that applies to a denial of a directed verdict, 
Liley reiterates that 
When an appellant challenges the denial of a motion for directed verdict 
based upon the sufficiency of the evidence, 'the applicable standard of 
review is highly deferential.' 'A defendant must overcome a substantial 
burden on appeal to show that the trial court erred in denying a motion for 
directed verdict.' 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ,r 32 (first quoting State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r 30; 
then quoting Gonzalez v. State, 2015 UT 10, ,r 27). 
ISSUE NO. 3: CSR argues that the jury's verdict was internally inconsistent. It 
does not appear that CSR preserved this issue for appeal because CSR failed to raise the 
issue at the trial court level. Utah's preservation rule reads: 
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the 
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that 
issue. This requirement puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted error 
and allows for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding. For a 
trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error ( 1) the issue must 
be raised in a timely fashion, (2) the issue must be specifically raised, and (3) 
the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority. 
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ,r 51 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted)1• See also MB. v. J.B., 2007 UT App 286, ,r 11 (issue not persevered where party 
failed to raise any objection regarding findings at the juvenile court). Put another way, "To 
preserve an issue for appeal, a litigant 'must enter an objection on the record that is both 
timely and specific."' Zavala v. Zavala, 2016 UT App 6, ,r 39 (quoting State v. Rangel, 
866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). 
After the jury delivered its verdict in the present case, CSR failed to make a motion 
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and CSR failed to make any other post-verdict 
or post-trial motion or objection challenging the jury's verdict and allowing the trial court 
an opportunity to reconcile any discrepancies within the jury's verdict before entering 
1 CSR cites 438 Main for the proposition that this Court's review of CSR's Summary Judgment is de nova. 438 Main 
actually states that, '·We review the district court's legal conclusions for correctness, and will reverse its factual 
findings only if they are clearly erroneous." Id. at~ 49. The Utah Supreme Colllt has implied that "'de nova" review 
differs from '"correctness" review. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-940 (Utah 1994). 
6 
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judgment. See generally Case History, attached hereto as Addendum No. 1. Consequently, 
CSR's Issue No. 3 was not preserved for appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: If, however, CSR had actually preserved its challenge 
to the jury's verdict, the standard of review for challenging the consistency of a jury verdict 
is very deferential towards upholding the jury verdict. 
'Where the possibility of inconsistency in jury interrogatories or special 
verdicts exists, [we] will not presume inconsistency; rather, [we] will seek to 
reconcile the answers if possible.' Accordingly, a jury's verdict will be 
sustained, even in the face of possible inconsistency, if the judgment can 'be 
read harmoniously.' Given this standard of review, the question for this court 
is whether it is reasonable to construe the jury's verdict with regard to these 
claims in a manner that gives effect to all of the jury's responses on the special 
verdict form. 
Nejf v. Neff, 2011 UT 6, ,r 76, (quoting Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 
1078, 1083 (Utah 1985)). When, as here, an appellant is essentially challenging the factual 
basis for a jury's verdict, that appellant must marshal the trial evidence that could be viewed 
as supporting the jury verdict. 
To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury verdict, 
the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the 
verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict. 
Riggs v. Asbestos Corp., 2013 UT App 86, ,r 31 ( quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 
P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991)). CSR has made no attempt to marshal the evidence in support 
of the jury's findings. The Court should therefore presume that the jury's verdict is 
substantially supported by the evidence introduced at trial. 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-407(l)(a) is directly at issue in this appeal. The text of 
this rule is attached as Addendum 2. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of CSR's Summary Judgment Motion, 
denial of CSR's Directed Verdict Motion, and the jury's verdict against CSR. Copies of 
the trial court's minutes denying summary judgment and Judgment on Jury Verdict are 
attached as Addenda 3 and 4, respectively. R. 674-676; and 801-803. 
II. DISPOSITION BELOW 
On November 3, 2011, Liley filed his Complaint, and on November 8, 2011, Liley 
filed an Amended Complaint naming the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT"), 
Juab County, Sanpete County, CSR, and Dale Dorius ("Dorius") as Defendants. Liley's 
Complaints alleged negligence for allowing a black angus cow to roam onto Highway 29 
near Levan, Utah. R. 9-10. Liley's car collided with the cow late at night, and the collision 
caused severe injuries to Liley and the vehicle Liley was driving. Id. 
Both Sanpete County and Juab County were dismissed from the action, R. 13, 154-
157, as was Dorius in his individual capacity. R. 192-194; 350-351. On September 9, 
2014, the parties participated in a pretrial conference and scheduled a jury trial to take place 
on March 3-5, 2015. 
8 
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While the parties were awaiting trial, CSR filed the Motion for Summary Judgment 
that is at issue in this appeal. R. 385-397. In that Motion, CSR argued that it did not own 
the cow that caused Liley's injuries and that CSR therefore did not owe any duty to Liley. 
R. 392. In response, Liley raised a number of issues of fact, such as who maintained CSR's 
fences, where the cow came from, and who controlled the cattle on CSR's land. R. 428-
431. Liley produced evidence that Dori us was the principal of both WCR and CSR, and 
that CSR's fencing had not been maintained for at least two years. R. 431-432. Liley also 
produced evidence that WCR was not a year-round tenant and only occupied CSR's land 
for three months per year. R. 437. Liley also pointed out that CSR had failed to identify 
any evidence to support its contention that WCR leased the land from CSR. R. 428-429. 
CSR filed a Reply that devoted itself primarily to trying to cure CSR's prior failure 
to provide support for its allegation that WCR leased the land from CSR. In its Reply, 
CSR could only point to a statement by Dorius that in 1972 CSR and WCR had orally 
agreed to a lease of the land. R. 487. CSR argued in its Reply that Dori us' self-serving 
and uncorroborated testimony that in 1972 CSR and WCR agreed that WCR "maintain" 
the fencing on CSR's property when it was in residence was sufficient to support summary 
judgment. R. 486-490. CSR's Reply failed to dispute Liley's stated facts. R. 492. 
On March 3, 2015, which was the first day of trial, the trial court denied CSR's 
motion for summary judgment. R. 674. The Court then proceeded with a three-day jury 
trial. R. 801-803. At the conclusion of Liley's case-in-chief, UDOT moved for a directed 
verdict on claims against UDOT, which the trial court granted. R. 804-806. CSR moved 
for a directed verdict on the issue of whether Liley had produced evidence to support a 
9 
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legal basis for recovery against CSR. R. 1302:9-1310:9. The Court denied CSR's Directed 
Verdict Motion and found that there was sufficient evidence for the matter to go to the jury. 
R. 1310: 10-1311: 12. At the conclusion of the evidentiary phase of trial, the trial court 
instructed the jury on the law. R. 1460:10-1478:10. The jury then found that CSR was 
partially at fault for the cow being on the highway, and that CSR's liability to Liley was in 
the amount of $304,940. R. 787-790. On March 20, 2015, the trial court entered a 
judgment on the jury verdict. R. 801-803. 
After trial, Liley sought his costs associated with his claims. R. 812-826. On June 
11, 2015, CSR moved to continue a supplemental proceeding regarding execution of the 
judgment. R. 1587-1590. The trial court granted CSR's Motion on June 25, 2015. R. 
1593-1595. On August 10, 2015, CSR moved to stay collection of the judgment pending 
this appeal. R. 1596-1604. CSR argued that no security was necessary because a judgment 
lien from the trial court's judgment already encumbered CSR's real property. R. 1603. On 
August 17, 2015, the Court granted CSR's Motion. See Case History at 24. CSR did not 
file any other motions after trial. See id. 
ill. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND MARSHALLING OF EVIDENCE. 
A. THE COLLISION WITH THE BLACK ANGUS COW. 
On October 4, 2009, Liley was traveling northbound on Highway 28 near Levan, 
Utah at approximately 2:00 a.m. R. 426-427; 985:21-986:8; 988:7-16. Liley was obeying 
the speed limit. R. 985:21-986:7; 1239:2-14. Near mile marker 20, Liley came over a 
small rise in the road and saw a cow standing in the middle of his lane facing west. R. 426-
7; 981:16-22. Liley swerved to avoid the cow, but struck the cow on the passenger side of 
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I" 
the truck that Liley was driving, killing the cow. Id. Liley immediately pulled over and 
called 911. R. 1225:22-1226:3. Liley was then able to investigate the cow that he struck, 
and found a blue tag on its ear that read "Dorius Family." R. 982:20-24. Liley was also 
able to hear a number of unseen cows bellowing from the east side of Highway 28. R. 
982:24-983: 18. Liley then used his flashlight to inspect the east side fence and discovered 
several large holes in the fence. See id. Liley had some experience in fencing cattle as a 
result of working on his father's ranches. See R. 987: 19-988:6. 
Later that day, Liley began experiencing severe pain in his wrist, shoulders, back, 
and neck. R. 991 :3-16. Over the next five years, Liley continued to experience severe pain 
despite consulting several physicians and physical therapists and undergoing years of 
treatment and medications. R. 992-98. Due to Liley's condition, he can no longer work 
as a chef or musician, or perform 90% of the tasks that Liley performed before the accident. 
R. 998-1001; R. 1005-1009. Liley has also become disabled due to his injuries and 
associated depression that resulted from the accident. R. 1001:20-1002:24. Liley 
continues to consult with physicians and undergo treatments for the injuries he sustained 
on October 9, 2009. R. 1002:25-1004: 17. 
In the spring of 2010, Liley returned to the scene of the crash with Jared Jensen, 
Frank Pippy, and others to further investigate the scene. R. 1010-1014. Liley asked Pippy 
to come because Pippy has expertise in cattle fences due to his 38 years as a professional 
cowboy herding cattle. See id. and R. 1157:8-1158:4. While at the scene, Liley took 
photographs of the carcass of the cow, the holes in the fence, and the surrounding area, and 
these photographs were published to the jury. R. 1010-1014. Liley inspected the fence on 
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the east side of Highway 28 and determined that it had not been repaired for many years, 
which Liley was able to determine from his experience working on a cattle ranch. R. 
1027 :23-1028: 13. Pippy also confirmed that the fence had not been maintained or repaired 
for at least one year. R. 1185: 18-1187:4. Liley eventually confirmed that CSR owned the 
land and fence in the photographs. See R. 1041 :6-23. 
B. DENIAL OF CSR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
On December 2, 2014, CSR moved for Summary Judgment. R. 385-397. CSR 
argued that it did not own the cow that caused Liley's injuries and that because CSR did 
not own the cow; CSR did not owe any duty to Liley. R. 392. In its Motion, CSR alleged 
that WCR leased the land from CSR and that WCR, was solely responsible for maintaining 
CSR's fences. R. 390 at 111. CSR, however, failed to cite any evidentiary support for its 
allegation. See id. 
In response to CSR's Summary Judgment Motion, Liley pointed out that CSR had 
failed to support its contention that WCR leased the land from CSR, or that a lease relieved 
CSR from any duty to maintain its own fences. R. 428-429. Liley also asserted that issues 
of fact existed, and that the evidence showed that CSR, and its principal, Darius were 
responsible for maintaining the fencing. R. 430-431. Liley argued that undisputed 
deposition testimony had established that CSR's fencing had not been maintained for at 
least two years. R. 431-432. Liley also asserted that CSR knew and ignored the fact that 
the fences were not being maintained. R. 432-433. 
CSR filed a Reply that devoted considerable space to addressing its prior failure to 
provide support for its allegation that WCR leased the land from CSR, and that the 
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purported lease required WCR to "maintain" the fencing on CSR's property during WCR's 
term in residence. R. 486-490. CSR's sole evidence consisted of self-serving testimony 
from Darius that he had orally agreed with himself on behalf of his entities in 1972 to 
"lease" the land from his one entity to his other entity. R.487. CSR argued that it had no 
duty to maintain the fencing on its own property, and that CSR did not legally "own" the 
cow. R. 490-492. 
On March 3, 2015, the first day of trial, the trial court and counsel for the parties 
met in Judge Brown's chambers regarding CSR's Summary Judgment Motion off the 
record, at which time the trial court made findings and denied CSR's Motion. R. 674. The 
Court then proceeded with a three-day jury trial. R. 801-803. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S OPENING INSTRUCTIONS TO THE 
JURY. 
After the trial court impaneled the jury, the trial court repeatedly instructed the jury 
that trial court and not the lawyers would instruct the jury on the law to apply. In the first 
such instruction, the trial court stated, 
At the end of the trial, I will explain the law that you must follow to reach 
your verdict. You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you do 
not agree with the law. 
R. 941:7-10. The trial court then reiterated this instruction by stating, "I will also instruct 
you on the law that you must apply. It's your role to follow that law and to decide what the 
facts are." R. 943:4-6. The Court then explained the lawyers' role in the trial: 
Neither the lawyers nor I actually decide the case. That is your role .. You 
should decide the case based upon the evidence presented in court and the 
instructions that I give you. It is the lawyers' role to present evidence, 
generally by.calling and questioning witnesses and presenting exhibits. Each 
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lawyer will also try to persuade you to decide the case in favor of his or her 
client. 
R. 943: 10-18. The trial court then reiterated that it would instruct the jury on the law that 
the jury must apply. 
1broughout the trial and after the evidence has been fully presented, I will 
instruct you on the law that you must apply. You must obey these 
instructions. You are not allowed to reach decisions that go against the law. 
R. 944:8-12. Immediately thereafter, the trial court once again clarified the lawyers' role 
to the jury by stating: 
The lawyers will then summarize and argue the case. · They will share with 
you their views of the evidence, how it relates to the law, and how they think 
you should decide the case. 
R. 944: 12-16. The trial court then reaffirmed that the trial court would instruct the jury on 
what law the jury should follow: 
Your verdict must be based on the evidence presented in court and on my 
instructions on the law, and I'll give you more instructions about that step a 
little bit later. From time to time throughout the trial, I will instruct you on 
the law. 
R. 943: 18-24 (emphasis supplied). Shortly thereafter, the trial court reaffirmed, for the 
fifth time, that it would tell the jury what the law is that they were to follow by stating: 
"The instructions that I give you are the law, and your oath requires you to follow my 
instructions even if you disagree with them." R. 945:5-7. 
D. OPENING STATEMENTS OF LILEY, UDOT, AND CSR. 
In Liley's opening statement, Liley outlined what happened and what the evidence 
would show. R. 955:11-957:1. Liley's counsel then went on to state that, 
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[I]n this case the rule is if you're in control of livestock, mean it's in your 
property, fencing it in, you have a duty to make sure, as best as possible --
you don't have to be perfect, you just have to use reasonableness, reasonable 
care. You have to use that reasonable care to make sure that your fence is in 
good enough shape that your cows don't get out. But what happened here. 
That black cow at 2:00 a.m. on October 4th of 2009 out in the middle of the 
road where it wasn't supposed to be, got out of a hole in the fence of the 
property next to it. 
R. 957:8-20. Neither CSR nor UDOT objected to this statement. R. 957. Liley's counsel 
then went on to state that, 
Now, I've introduced you to Pat Liley. You have two defendants here today. 
One is Utah Department of Transportation. The other is Cedar Springs Creek 
Ranch. The owner of the property is the ranch. The owner of the property 
is responsible to make sure that they take reasonable care in maintaining their 
fences ... 
R. 957:25-958:4. Neither CSR nor UDOT objected to this statement. R. 958. Liley's 
attorney then went on to state that UDOT's duty is "Nondelegable." R. 958:5-10. Neither 
CSR nor UDOT objected to this statement. R. 958. Later, when Liley's attorney was 
discussing UDOT's duty, UDOT's attorney objected as follows: 
When I said UDOT has a nondelegable duty, that duty is if they own the 
fence, unless they have a written agreement with the owner of the property 
that they're going -- that the owner is going to maintain the fence, they have 
to do it. You're not going to hear any evidence from UDOT that they had an 
agreement with Cedar Springs to maintain the property. 
l\1R. FERRE: Object, Your Honor. He's arguing the law, and it's a complete 
misstatement of the law, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection. You are entitled to 
address the law, Counsel, in your opening statement. You can address any 
inconsistencies you think exist. 
R. 959:21-960:10 (emphasis supplied). UDOT's objection is the only objection that 
occurred during Liley's opening statement. R. 955-976. CSR's counsel never objected to 
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any portion of Liley's opening statement, much less any portion wherein Liley's counsel 
addressed the law concerning CSR's liability. R. 955-976. However, both UDOT's 
attorney and CSR's attorney argued the law in their opening statements. R. 967:24-968: 13; 
969:14-22; 972:6-10; 974:18-25. 
E. LILEY'S CASE-IN-CIDEF EVIDENCE. 
i. Liley's Testimony. 
After opening statements, Liley testified in his case-in-chief as the first witness. R. 
976. Liley testified that he and his friend, Doc Vigos, a former professor of quantitative 
mathematics at the University of Utah, left Salina, Utah on October 3, 2009 to avoid a 
storm that was approaching where they two men had been hunting elk. R. 978-979. Liley 
testified that he was not tired and was alert, and was driving at or below the speed limit, 
which is his usual practice. R. 989:25-990:1; 985:21-986:5. Liley then explained that 
while traveling on Highway 28, just past Yuba Reservoir, he came over a little rise in the 
road, and saw a cow in the middle of the road. R. 981: 16-20. Liley also said, "When I 
seen the cow, it was facing from east to west, and it turned its head, and I seen the glare in 
the eyes, and I swerved, and I hit it on the passenger side." R. 981:19-22. Liley further · 
testified that upon inspecting the dead cow, he noticed it had a blue tag that said "Darius 
Family." R. 982: 15-983:3. Liley then explained that he was able to determine that the cow 
came from the east side of Highway 28 because of the bellowing of other cows. R. 982:24-
983: 18; 1079:14-1080:15. Liley testified that he inspected the fence and found numerous 
gaping holes in the fence and that the fence was in disrepair. R. 983:19-984:18. Liley 
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testified that he had experience in ranch fences based on working on his father's ranches. 
See R. 987: 19-988:6. 
Liley testified that he returned to the scene of the accident in the spring to further 
inspect the area and take photographs. R. 1010:14-1012:15. The photographs Liley took 
are included as part of the record. R. 1605 at Exhibit 6. Liley testified that the photographs 
showed the holes in the fencing on the east side of Highway 28 and the general state of 
disrepair of that fencing. R. 1015-1027. Liley further testified that during his inspection 
of the fence, he saw ten or more places where the fence was in disrepair. R. 1027: 15-22. 
Regarding the owner of the land and fencing on the east side of Highway 28, Liley testified 
that he had done an investigation of ownership maps, and discovered that CSR owned the 
land. R. 1030:17-1031:7; 1032:11-1033:2. 
ii. Frank Pippy's Testimony. 
Liley called Mr. Frank Pippy, a friend of Liley's that had been a professional 
cowboy for 38 years. R. 1157:6-18. Pippy testified that he had ridden and fixed countless 
miles of cattle fencing. R 1157: 19-24. Pippy testified that he rode along the cattle fences 
to check for repairs and holes so that the cattle do not escape. R. 1157:25-1126:4. 
According to Pippy, fixing cattle fences is "a constant job" and is also necessary for safety. 
R. 1158:5-23. Pippy testified that given his 38-year career he had good understanding of 
what to look for in a fence to determine whether it is in disrepair and what problems can 
result. R. 1158:24-1160:23; 1162:4-1163:18. 
Pippy testified that Pippy went with Liley in approximately March of 2010 to 
inspect CSR's fence. R. 1167:7-1169:3. Pippy testified that he walked a total of 
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approximately two miles along the fence lines on the east and west side of Highway 28. 
R. 1169:5-8. Pippy testified that he could not see any signs that cattle had been grazing on 
the west side of Highway 28, but that there were ample signs that cattle had been on the 
east side of Highway 28. R. 1169:9-1172: 10. Pippy was then shown the sam~ photographs 
that were marked as Exhibit 6 at trial. R. 1172-1192. In the process of examining these 
photographs, Pippy testified that there was a major hole in the east side fence that a cow 
could easily pass through, which is depicted in the top photograph on page 1156. R. 
1173 :4-17. Pippy also testified that due to the lack of any hair on the fence, other than cow 
hair, that the hole had most likely been caused by cows leaning on the fence for quite some 
time. R. 1174:3-1176:7. Pippy testified that repairing and maintaining a cattle fence is a 
constant priority, and if cattle had been kept on the east side land, then the fence should 
have been checked multiple times. R. 1176:8-1177:22. Also, that the hole depicted on 
page 1156 of Exhibit 6 should be fixed immediately and definitely not left for the following 
year. R. 1177:23-1178: 10. Pippy testified about the existence of holes and other 
deficiencies in the fence that were depicted on pages 1158-1167. R. 1179-1192. In all, 
Pippy testified that he had seen six to nine places on the fence that appeared to have been 
neglected for a long time. R. 1182:3-15. In fact, Pippy testified that the east side fence 
"just was very weak, way neglected," and "it ain't been maintained for years." R. 1182: 10-
15. Pippy further testified: 
Q So it's your opinion that the entire length of fence that you looked at on the 
east side hadn't been maintained in years? 
A My opinion. 
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Q Certainly not something where a cowboy was riding it every day making 
repairs? 
A Oh, no. If he had a man out there or someone, no problem. You wouldn't 
have none of this. 
Q Because why not? 
A Fence is maintained and done properly, right. 
Q So if there had been routine maintenance on the fence on the east side of 
State Road 28 in the mile that you walked up and down, you wouldn't have 
seen these holes? 
A No, sir. 
R. 1182:16-1183:7. 
iii. Trooper Jared Jensen's Testimony. 
Liley called Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Jared Jensen. R. 1215-1222. Trooper 
Jensen testified that he responded to the collision and arrived to see Liley's one-ton truck 
with "heavy front-end damage," with pieces of the truck strewn across the Highway 28, 
see R. 1224:10-17, and that the truck was not drivable. R. 990:13-15; 1235:13-18. Trooper 
Jensen testified that he then conducted an investigation and confirmed that there was a 
large black cow, in the dark, and against the black pavement was struck and died. R. 
1225:22-1226:3. Trooper Jensen also testified that his investigation confirmed that Liley 
was not speeding. R. 1239:2-14. Trooper Jensen further testified that he inspected the 
dead cow and discovered the blue tag on its ear that, according to Trooper Jensen's report, 
stated: "Darius Family Farms, Fayette, Utah." R. 1224:18-1225:6. Trooper Jensen 
additionally testified that two days later when Trooper Jensen returned to the scene for 
follow-up investigation the dead cow was still where it had been, but the head of the cow, 
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including the Darius Family's tag, had been removed. R. 1227:16-1228:9. Trooper Jensen 
further testified that the contact person or potential owner of the cow was listed as Dale 
Dorius. R. 1232:18-1233:20. Trooper Jensen also testified that he knows Darius' name 
because "he owns cows in the area" and that it was his understanding that Dorius owned 
cows in that area. R. 1233:21-1234:3. Trooper Jensen also testified that in his experience 
he has seen cows kept on the east side of Highway 28. R. 1234:12-1235:9. 
iv. Testimony of Dale Dorius. 
Liley called Dorius to the stand. R. 1242. Dorius testified that he is the president 
and one of two shareholders, the other being Dori us' wife, of Cedar Springs Ranch, Inc. 
("CSR"), and has been so since the late 1990s. R. 1242:20-1243 :8. Dorius also is also one 
of six shareholders in Warm Creek Ranch, Inc. ("WCR"). R. 1267:4-10. Dorius admitted 
that CSR owns land on the east side of Highway 29 near Levan, Utah. R. 1243:19-1244:8. 
Dorius testified that in or about 1972, Dorius, on behalf of CSR, entered into an oral lease 
with Dorius, on behalf of WCR, that allowed WCR to graze cattle on CSR's land for 
approximately four months of every year. R. 1265:13-17; 1266:7-14; 1264:4-6. Dorius 
admitted that there is no evidence other than his own testimony about the terms of the 
purported lease. R. 1266:7-14. Dorius was further forced to admit that CSR judicially 
admitted in its responses to Liley's Interrogatories that Dorius is one of the individuals 
responsible for maintaining the cattle on CSR's land. R. 1245:6-15. Dorius also admitted 
that all of the photographs in Exhibit 6 were of the fence on the east side of Highway 28 
and that the fence shown in those photographs was in disrepair. R. 1246-1251; 1254:6-14. 
Dorius also admitted that he was running angus cattle on CSR's land on October 4, 2009. 
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R 1252:7-14. Dorius also testified that he had not produced any documents as to whether 
any of those cattle were lost in 2009. R 1257: 14-17. Dorius further testified that when no 
cattle are present on CSR's land, no repairs to the fence are made. R. 1261 :2-6. Dorius 
then admitted that during the other eight months of the year, when no cattle are present, 
CSR did not maintain or inspect the fence. R. 1261: 7-16. 
F. CSR'S DIRECTED VERDICT MOTION. 
At the conclusion of Liley's case-in-chief, CSR moved for a directed verdict on 
whether there was evidence of'·a legal basis for recovery against [CSR]." R. 1302:11-13. 
CSR argued that Liley had not established that CSR owed Liley a duty. R. 1302:23-25. 
CSR argued that, '"The owner of the cow is unknown." R. 1302:25-1303-2. CSR then 
argued that it had leased its land to WCR, and that it was WCR's duty to maintain the 
fence. R. 1304:10-1305:17. CSR then attempted to invoke Stephenson v. Warren to argue 
that CSR was not responsible for WCR's failure to keep the fence in good repair because 
a tenant is responsible for conditions the tenant created or that came into existence while 
the tenant was in possession. R. 1304: 15-25 
In response, Liley pointed out that there was evidence of a long-standing fence on 
the property and that CSR allowed cattle onto the property. R. 1306:15-22. CSR pointed 
out that there was testimony from Mr. Pippy that CSR's fence had not been maintained in 
years. R. 1308: 1-12. 
CSR then replied by arguing that CSR did not own, possess, or control any livestock, 
and that therefore CSR had no duty to feed or maintain the cattle. R. 1309:2-6. CSR argued 
that because WCR owned the cattle, it had control and possession over those cattle, 
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wherever those cattle happen to be. R. 1309:7-9. CSR then stated that because there had 
been testimony that it was WCR's duty to maintain the fences, the Court should accept that 
evidence. R. 1309: 14-20. CSR argued that because Dorius testified that WCR had a duty 
to maintain the fences, CSR had no duty to maintain the fence or the cattle. R 1309: 17-
23. 
After considering the parties' oral arguments, the Court denied CSR's Directed 
Verdict Motion as follows: 
THE COURT: Thank you. In making this ruling, I want to make clear 
that in no way is my ruling intended to address any breach of piercing the 
corporate veil. I understand the difference of the different corporations that 
are at issue here, although I'm hesitant to even try to say the names because 
I'm sure I would get warm and cedar and springs and creek mixed up. I 
certainly do understand the distinction between those. 
However, the difference here is that while they are distinct legal 
entities, Mr. Dorius is a principal in both. There is a landlord/tenant 
relationship based upon his own testimony, and I do find that a landlord does 
have some duty to control the actions of its tenant, and I would say that at 
least in this case I would think that duty perhaps is slightly greater given the 
close interrelationship of the parties. 
And so unlike the directed verdict for UDOT, I am going to find that 
there is sufficient competent evidence to go to the jury on the issue of 
negligence with regard to Cedar Springs Ranch. And I note in making this 
decision that there's already been an indication of an intent to allocate fault 
to Warm Springs which Cedar Springs still has available to it in this action. 
And so I'm going to deny the motion for the directed verdict, and we'll move 
forward on that basis. 
R. 1310: 10-1311: 12. 
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G. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS RELATED TO DUTY AND 
CONTROL. 
After all of the evidence was presented, the trial court presented the jury with more 
instructions on the law, including an instruction on CSR's duty. CSR did not object to the 
following jury instruction originally submitted by UDOT: 
Patrick Liley alleges that Cedar Springs Ranch was negligent in failing to 
maintain the fence located on Cedar Springs Ranch property in a reasonably 
safe condition. In determining whether Cedar Springs Ranch is negligent, 
you are instructed that Cedar Springs Ranch, as the landowner, has the 
ability to control Warm Creek Ranch's activity on the land. You are 
further instructed that Cedar Springs Ranch is required to use reasonable 
care in controlling Warm Creek Ranch when Cedar Springs knows or 
should know that this control is necessary to prevent harm to others. 
If you find that Cedar Springs Ranch [and Warm Creek Ranch] was negligent 
in any of these respects, then you must determine whether that negligence 
was a cause of harm to Patrick Liley. 
R. 584 (alteration in 763) (emphasis supplied); see also 1399:22-1400:9. UDOT first 
submitted the above instruction as Defendant's Instruction No. 8. R. 575; 1392:2-6. On 
March 4, 2015, the second day of trial, and before any motions for a directed verdict, CSR 
stipulated to Defendant's Instruction No. 8. R. 1399:22-1400:9; 1302-1311. After the trial 
court denied CSR' s directed verdict motion, the parties examined the jury instructions that 
would be the final jury instructions, including Defendant's Instruction No. 8 (Final 
Instruction No. 6). R. 1399: 13-1403:22. During the discussion of that particular jury 
instruction, CSR's counsel, Ms. Reyes, once again did not object to it. See id. The Court 
then gave the above-quoted instruction to the jury as Instruction No. 6. R. 1463: 11-1464: 1. 
CSR also stipulated to Defendant's Instruction No. 30, which became Final 
Instruction No. 4. R. 584; 761; 1397:5-1399:6 1399:22-1400:9. The only change from the 
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original instruction was that it no longer identified UDOT. R. 1397:10-20. The Final 
Instruction No. 4 ultimately read: 
Cedar Springs Ranch and Warm Creek Ranch are corporations and act or fail 
to act when their officers, employees, or agents act or fail to act within the 
scope of their duties or authority. 
R. 761; 1397:16-20; 1462:7-11. 
Final Instruction No. 7 originally was Defendant's Instruction No. 11 and CSR 
agreed to the instruction in its original form. R. 588; 1399:22-1400:9. When the trial court 
dismissed UDOT as a party, Liley and CSR discussed adapting Defendant's Instruction 
No. 11 to address Liley's allegations of negligence against CSR. R. 1404:7-1406:2. CSR 
objected that Liley's Amended Complaint did not allege the claims against CSR that 
UDOT stated in Defendant's Instruction No. 11, but CSR acknowledged that the claim had 
been argued in trial that very day. R. 1406:7-12. The trial court read the Amended 
Complaint and determined that the language of Liley' s Amended Complaint was broad 
enough to support the instruction. R. 1407:11-1408:8. CSR then argued for certain 
alterations, R. 1408:9-13, and the trial court accepted CSR's proposed alterations regarding 
allegations by CSR against WCR. R. 1408:14-1409:6. The following day, the parties 
convened and further modified the instruction to include both of Liley's bases for his 
negligence claim against CSR. R. 1455:7-1456:25. Defendant's Instruction No. 11 thus 
became Final Instruction No. 7 and was read as follows to the jury: 
Plaintiff alleges that Cedar Springs Ranch was negligent in the following 
respects: 
Cedar Springs Ranch failed to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the 
fence to prevent cattle from coming onto the highway; 
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Cedar Springs Ranch violated a Utah safety law that requires a cattle owner 
to keep its cattle from straying or remaining unaccompanied in the highway. 
A violation of a safety law is evidence of negligence. 
The safety law states, quote, A person who owns or is in possession or control 
of any livestock may not negligently permit any of the livestock to stray or 
remain unaccompanied on a highway if both sides of the highway are 
separated from adjoining property by a fence, wall, hedge, sidewalk, curb, 
lawn or building. In any civil action brought for damages caused with any 
domestic animal or livestock on a highway, there is no presumption that the 
collision was due to negligence on behalf of the owner or the person in 
possession of the domestic animal or livestock. 
If you find that Cedar Springs Ranch was negligent, then you must determine 
whether that negligence was a cause of harm to Patrick Liley. 
R. 764; 1464:2-1465:2. 
H. CLOSING ARGUMENTS OF LILEY AND CSR. 
Liley closed by asking the jury to find that CSR was responsible for the cow being 
in the road. R. 1478:18-1479-2. Liley's counsel directed the jury's attention to Instruction 
No. 7. R. 1479: 18-1480:7. Liley's counsel then argued about the factual question of 
possession or control. R. 1480:8-14. Liley's attorney then reviewed the evidence 
regarding fault and damages. R. 1480-1493. Liley argued against allocating fault, but 
Liley also told the jury that if the jury believed WCR was at fault, they were to so indicate 
on the special verdict form. R. 1494:4-6. 
CSR acknowledged in closing that there were two separate grounds for possibly 
finding CSR negligent: "Either that Cedar Springs Ranch failed to exercise reasonable 
care in maintaining the fence, [or] that they violated a Utah safety law." R. 1522:2-4. 
CSR's attorney then argued for a narrow interpretation of Utah's Safety Law. R. 1523:1-
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7. CSR's attorney conceded that the jury could find negligence when a cow is on a 
highway and causes a collision, R. 1524:10-1525:2, and that CSR had the ability to control 
WCR's activity on the land. R. 1525:12-16. 
Liley' s Rebuttal then refocused the jury on Instruction No. 7 and quoted the 
language of the Safety Law. R. 154 7 :23-1548: 13. Liley then argued for the application 
of that law to the facts of the case. R.1548:14-22; 1549:12-1550:8. 
At no point during closing arguments did CSR object to Liley's closing. R. 1478-
1559. The only interruption was during Liley's Rebuttal, where CSR's attorney had a 
clarification question about versions of documents that were being used. R. 1546:24-
1547:11. 
At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury found that: (1) CSR was at fault; (2) 
CSR was 85% at fault for the harm to Liley; (3) Liley was 15% at fault; and that Liley's 
total damages amounted to $304,940. R. 787-790. On March 20, 2015, the trial court 
entered a judgment on the jury verdict. R. 801-803. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Issues of material fact concerning scope of duty, possession, and control of 
the cattle, and negligence precluded summary judgment or a directed verdict in CSR's 
favor. Because the trial court denied summary judgment based on the presence of factual 
issues and held a jury trial, there is no appellate review of the trial court's summary 
judgment ruling. CSR invokes Stephenson v. Warner, as a basis for absolving a landlord 
of liability, but Stephenson only absolves a landlord from liability for damages that result 
from a condition created by the tenant. CSR failed to off er any evidence that the defective 
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fencing was caused by its tenant, and substantial evidence was presented to show that CSR 
caused the condition. CSR also relies solely on the self-serving testimony of its President, 
Dale Dorius, to establish the existence and terms of existence of a purported 44-year old 
oral lease with another company controlled by Mr. Dorius. The jury was free to conclude 
that this uncorroborated and self-serving testimony of Mr. Dorius was not credible and that 
there was no lease. The evidence at trial provided a substantial basis for the jury to find 
that CSR was at fault and liable for the injuries Liley suffered, and CSR cannot carry its 
burden to demonstrate otherwise. 
II. Although CSR spends much of its brief attacking the opening statements and 
closing arguments ofLiley's counsel, CSR never objected at the trial cowt level regarding 
the opening statements and closing arguments of Liley's counsel. Thus, CSR failed to 
preserve the issue for appeal. 
III. The jury received ample and repeated instructions that they were only to heed 
and follow the trial cowt's instructions regarding what law to apply. Utah law presumes 
that the jury followed those instructions, unless evidence is shown to the contrary. Here, 
CSR has failed to present any evidence to the contrary, and thus the presumption that the 
jury followed the trial court's instructions is unrebutted. 
IV. By stipulating to jury instructions that stated that CSR had the duty and 
ability to control WCR, and then emphasizing that point to the jury, CSR invited any error 
that may have existed in that instruction, and may not now challenge the results of that 
instruction on appeal. 
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V. Liley's negligence claim was grounded on two separate duties. First, the 
Safety Law imposed a duty upon owners, possessors, and controllers of livestock to keep 
them off highways. Second, CSR had a common law duty to control its tenant and to 
protect the general public. CSR acknowledged these alternative duties in is closing 
arguments. The jury could therefore find a breach of either or both duties to arrive at a 
finding that CSR was negligent. 
VI. CSR accuses the trial court of ruling that CSR owed a greater duty because 
of Dorius' involvement in both CSR and WCR. But the trial court merely opined that a 
greater duty might exist, and it allowed the jury to determine the scope of CSR's duty. 
VII. CSR never raised any issue regarding the inconsistency of the jury's verdict 




THE QUESTION OF WHETHER CSR HAD A DUTY TO KEEP ITS 
FENCES IN GOOD REP AIR WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE 
JURY. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED CSR'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
CSR contends that it was entitled to summary judgment and later a directed verdict 
on the ground that no fact finder could reasonably conclude that CSR owed a duty to Liley 
to keep the fences in functional condition. Because of the existence of factual issues and 
the jury's subsequent finding in favor of Liley at trial, the trial court's denial of CSR's 
motion for summary judgement should not even be reviewed on appeal. See Kerr v. Salt 
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Lake City, 2013 UT 75,129 and Hone v. Advanced Shoring & Underpinning, Inc., 2012 
UT App 327, 16. Even if this Court were to disregard that rule and consider the merits of 
CSR's summary judgment argument, CSR cannot escape the legal maxim that questions 
about possession and control are inherently questions of fact. Rahofy v. Steadman, 2012 
UT 70,121 (possession or control of medical records is ultimately a question of fact); State 
v. Bowen, 143 P. 134, 135 (Utah 1914) (what constitutes recent possession of a cow is a 
question of fact). So too is the question of negligence. 
'Ordinarily, the question of negligence is a question of fact for the jury. 
Thus, summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the most 
clear instances.' 
Baczuk v. Salt Lake Regional Med. Ctr., 2000 UT App 225, 1 5 ( quoting Hunt v. Hurst, 
785 P.2d 414, 415 (Utah 1990). These questions of fact precluded summary judgment or 
a directed verdict in CSR's favor. 
CSR tried to evade these fact questions in its trial court motions, and CSR tries to 
do so again on appeal, by arguing that Stephenson v. Warner, 581 P.2d 567 (Utah 1978), 
immunizes a landlord from liability for any event that occurs on leased property. But 
Stephenson does not categorically relieve a landlord from any and all duties to maintain its 
property simply because a tenancy exists. See id. at 568-569. Stephenson merely holds 
that it is th~ tenant, rather than the landlord, who is liable for those conditions that the 
tenant creates or permits to come into being during its tenancy. According to Stephenson, 
[I]t is the tenant who is liable for any dangerous condition on the premises 
which he creates or permits to come into existence after he has taken 
possession. 
Id. at 568-569 ( emphasis supplied). 
29 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The evidence before the trial court at summary judgment included CSR' s judicial 
admission in its responses to Liley's Interrogatories that its president and half-owner, Dale 
Dori us, was responsible for maintaining the cattle. R. 43 7. The evidence also established 
that CSR owned the land and allowed cattle to graze on that land. R. 429. Indeed, cattle 
were grazing that land at the time of the accident, and the cow that caused the accident had 
been "heading west from Cedar Springs Ranch and was separated from its herd ... " and 
"there were no cattle on the west side of the road." R. 429; 492. Moreover, the fence on 
CSR's Property, which was near the accident site, had not been maintained or repaired in 
any way for at least two years. R. 429; 492. The evidence further established that CSR 
owned the property, had fencing on its property year-round, and did not maintain or inspect 
the fences for approximately nine months out of the year. R. 437; 443-444. Thus, there 
was ample evidence in the summary judgment record to conclude that CSR possessed or 
controlled the cattle, or was responsible for maintaining the cattle and the fencing, to a 
sufficient degree to impose liability upon CSR for its role in allowing the black angus cow 
to enter the highway. At the very least, this evidence presented a question of fact regarding 
possession and control of the cattle and the fences sufficient to overcome summary 
judgment. 
The self-serving testimony of Dori us about a purported 40-year-old oral lease with 
a fence maintenance provision was unsupported by any evidence other than Dori us' own 
testimony, and CSR did not identify that testimony until its Reply brief was filed. For that 
reason alone the trial court was in a position to deny summary judgment. 
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'It is the responsibility of the moving party to raise in its ... motion all of 
the issues on which it believes it is entitled to [prevail]. Allowing the moving 
party to raise new issues in its rebuttal materials is improper because the 
nonmoving party has no opportunity to respond. It is for this reason that, in 
the analogous area of appellate review, the rule is well settled that the court 
will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.' 
State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1003-1004 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting White 
v. Kent Medical Ctr. Inc., 810 P.2d 4, 8 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)) (emphasis and alterations 
in original). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED CSR'S MOTION FOR A 
DIRECTED VERDICT. 
Turning to the evidence during Liley's case-in-chief at trial, Liley introduced 
substantial evidence to support a jury finding that CSR was at fault if for no other reason 
than for failing to maintain its own fences for the eight months that WCR was not in 
residence. 
As a threshold matter, it was CSR's duty in this appeal to marshal that evidence for 
this Court. See UTAHR APP. P. 24(a)(9). 
When a party challenges a trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict 
or judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the basis of insufficiency of the 
evidence, we follow one standard of review: We reverse only if, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, we conclude that 
the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Accordingly, this standard 
obligates the appealing party to marshal the evidence in support of the verdict 
and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict. In other words, demonstrating 
insufficiency of the evidence requires an appealing party to show that all the 
evidence in favor of the verdict cannot support the verdict. 
Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 77, 1 33 (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). A party who fails to marshal evidence when required to do so '"will 
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almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal if it fails to marshal."' 
Schreib v. Whitmer, 2016 UT App 61, ,r 28 n.9 ( quoting State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 1 
42). 
Because CSR failed to assemble any of the probative evidence that Liley introduced 
in his case-in-chief, Liley has been forced to conduct that marshalling exercise for CSR. 
SCR should be required to reimburse Liley for the legal fees that Liley incurred to marshal 
the evidence that is set forth in this brief. See Fay v. Rodgers, 2010 UT App LEXIS 28, 
*9-*10 and UTAH R. APP. P. 33. 
The evidence presented at trial established that the cow that caused the accident 
came from CSR's Property. Dale Dorius, CSR's president and 50% owner, testified that 
CSR owns the land on the east side of Highway 28 near Levan, Utah. R. 1243:19-1244:8. 
Liley confirmed this fact as well. R. 1030:17-1031:7; 1032:11-1033:2. Dorius admitted 
that CSR allows cattle to graze on its land from July through October each year, and has 
done so since 1972. R. 1265:13-17; 1266:7-14; 1264:4-6. Dorius also specifically 
admitted that he was running cattle on CSR's land on October 4, 2009, i.e., the date of the 
accident. R. 1252:7-14. Mr. Liley testified that on the night of the accident, he heard cows 
bellowing on the east side of Highway 28. R. 982 :24-983: 18; 1079: 14-1080: 15. Liley also 
testified that the cow was headed from east to west when he struck it. R. 981: 19-22. 
Trooper Jensen confirmed that the cow that caused Liley's injuries had a blue ear tag that 
stated that the cow belonged to Dorius Family Farms. R. 1224:18-1225:6. Trooper Jensen 
also confirmed that that Dorius was the contact person for the cow. R. 1232: 18-1234:3. 
Thus, the jury could reasonably find that cow was from CSR's Property. 
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The evidence presented at trial also established that CSR failed to maintain the 
fences on its Property. CSR's President, Darius, admitted that he is one of the parties 
responsible for maintaining the cattle. R. 1245:6-15. Darius also admitted under oath that 
the pictures admitted as Exhibit 6 at trial showed the fence on the east side of Highway 28, 
and that the fence appeared to be in disrepair. R. 1246-1251; 1252:7-6-14. Darius also 
admitted that for the nine months when WCR is not on the land, the fences are not inspected 
or maintained by CSR. R. 1261 :2-16. Liley testified that on the night of the accident, Liley 
inspected the fence and noticed that the fence was heavily rusted, in a state a disrepair, and 
that several gaping holes existed in the fence. R. 983: 19-984: 18. Therefore, the jury could 
reasonably conclude that CSR had failed to maintain the fence. 
The evidence also demonstrated that the fence had been in a state of extreme 
disrepair for years. Mr. Liley testified that the he saw numerous holes in the fence and that 
the fence was in a general state of disrepair. R. 1015-1027. Liley also testified that many 
metal portions of the fence were rusted and did not appear to have been repaired in years. 
R. 1027:23-1028:16. Mr. Pippy, who viewed the fence first-hand, testified that there was 
a major hole in the east side fence that a cow could easily crawl through, which was 
depicted on page 1156 of Exhibit 6. R. 1173:4-17. Mr. Pippy also opined that this hole 
should have been fixed immediately and not left for the following year. R. 11 77 :23-
1178: 10. Pippy then went on to testify of seeing numerous other holes and deficiencies 
that were accurately depicted on pages 1158-1167 of Exhibit 6. R. 1179-1182. Pippy also 
repeatedly testified that nothing had been done to repair the fence in years. R. 1182:3-
1183 :7. Accordingly, there was ample evidence that: ( 1) the cow came from CSR' s 
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Property; (2) CSR failed to maintain its fence; (3) CSR had not maintained its fence for 
years; and (4) CSR's failure to maintain its fence predated WCR's current tenancy. 
CSR's principal, Dale Darius, attempted to deflect its duty to maintain the fences 
by testifying that WCR had orally agreed to maintain the fences 44 years earlier, but the 
only evidence of that purported lease was Darius' self-serving testimony, which the jury 
was free to believe or disbelieve. See Van Der Heyde v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 845 
P.2d 275,280 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("The fact finder may or may not find such self-serving 
testimony credible."). Indeed, Dori us even admitted under oath that there was no tangible 
evidence of a lease. 
Q Mr. Darius, you've talked about this lease to Warm Creek. There's no 
written lease for that, is there? 
A It's been an oral lease. 
Q So we don't have any evidence that shows what the terms of that lease or 
what is required by your agreement with Warm Creek, do we, that we can 
look at? 
A No, you don't have a written agreement. 
R. 1266:7-15. Given the lack of any corroborating evidence whatsoever, the jury was well 
within its province to disbelieve Dori us' self-serving statements about the existence of any 
lease or, at a minimum, a fence maintenance provision in the lease. In fact, given that the 
jury expressly found that CSR was at fault, and that WCR was not at fault, it appears that 
the jury did not find Dori us' self-serving description of a fence maintenance agreement to 
be credible. R. 788. According to Neff v. Neff, the Court must accept this explanation for 
the jury's verdict. See 2011 UT 6, ,r 16. 
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At the very least, the evidence allowed the jury to decide whether the holes in the 
fence were created during WCR's brief current tenancy or whether the holes existed when 
CSR controlled the fences a few months earlier. This factual question alone was sufficient 
to require the trial court to deny CSR's Motion for a Directed Verdict. 
II. CSR CANNOT ATTACK THE OPENING AND CLOSING STATEMENTS 
OF LILEY'S COUNSEL ON APPEAL WHEN CSR FAILED TO OBJECT 
TO LILEY'S OPENING OR CLOSING STATEMENTS AT TRIAL. 
CSR devotes a great deal of its Briefto arguing that the trial court erred by allowing 
Liley's counsel to argue about the application of the facts to Utah's Safety Law. But CSR 
never objected to Liley's opening or closing statement at trial. 
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the 
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that 
issue. This requirement puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted error 
and allows for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding. For a 
trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error ( 1) the issue must 
be raised in a timely fashion, (2) the issue must be specifically raised, and (3) 
the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority. 
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, 1 51 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). As this Court has stated that, "To preserve an issue for appeal, a litigant 'must 
enter an objection on the record that is both timely and specific."' Zavala v. Zavala, 2016 
UT App 6, if 39 (quoting State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). The 
objection mentioned in CSR's brief is that of Mr. Ferre, UDOT's attorney. Appellant's 
Brief at 8; R. 959:21-960: 10. CSR failed to raise any objection. R. 955-976. CSR similarly 
failed to file any motion after trial objecting to Liley's statements. CSR cannot sit on its 
hands during trial and then raise an objection for the time on appeal. 
35 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ID. THERE IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO SUGGEST THAT THE JURY 
FAILED TO HEED AND FOLLOW THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
CSR argues that jury was improperly influenced by the arguments of Liley's 
attorney and that this caused the jury to disregard the jury instructions on the applicable 
law. In Utah, "We presume that a jury will follow the instructions given it." State v. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 939, 401 (Utah 1994). See also Hahne/ v. Duchesne Land, LC, 2013 
UT App 150, ,r 14 (same). This Court has repeatedly emphasized that, 
'In the absence of the appearance of something persuasive to the contrary, 
we assume thatjurors were conscientious in performing ... their duty, and that 
they followed the instructions of the court.' 
State v. Toki, 2011 UT App 293, ,r 34 (quoting State v. Burk, 8239 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992)). 
Here, the trial court repeatedly instructed the jury that it must only listen to the trial 
court as to what law to apply. R. 941:7-10; 943:4-6; 943: 18-24; 944:8-12; 945:5-7. Indeed, 
the trial court not only instructed the jury that the trial court would instruct them as to the 
law, but explained that the attorneys would be trying to persuade them, and that the 
attorneys would give their view of how the facts related to the law. This is precisely what 
Liley's counsel did in his opening and closing arguments. R. 943:10-18; 944:12-16. It is 
also what UDOT's attorney and CSR's attorney did in their opening statements as well. R. 
967:24-968:13; 969:14-22; 972:6-10; 974:18-25. CSR then again argued what the Safety 
Law meant in its closing arguments. R. 1523: 1-7. CSR has failed to point to any real 
evidence that the jury disregarded the trial court's instructions. The fact that the jury did 
not agree with CSR's counsel does not mean that the jury's decision should be disregarded. 
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Because of these facts, CSR has failed to overcome the presumption that the jury followed 
the trial court's instructions. 
IV. CSR'S STIPULATION TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS 6 AND 7 CONCEDED 
THAT CSR HAD A DUTY AND THE ABILITY TO CONTROL WCR. 
CSR argues that it did not have a duty to Liley as the landowner to maintain the 
fences. However, CSR's stipulation and agreement to Jury Instruction Nos. 6 and 7 refutes 
CSR's argument. In Utah, the invited error doctrine holds that: 
Under the doctrine of invited error, however, Utah courts 'have declined to 
engage in even plain error review when counsel, either by statement or act, 
affirmatively represented to the trial court that he or she had no objection to 
the proceeding.' 
State v. Cheek, 2015 UT App 243,162 (quoting State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, if 14). CSR 
invited any error by stipulating to Instructions No. 6 and 7. 
Instruction No. 6 established that CSR had a duty to use reasonable care in 
controlling WCR when it knew or should have known that the control was necessary to 
prevent harm to others. In this regard, Instruction No. 6 specifically states: 
You are further instructed that Cedar Springs Ranch is required to use 
reasonable care in controlling Warm Creek Ranch when Cedar Springs 
knows or should know that this control is necessary to prevent harm to others. 
R. 7 63 ( emphasis supplied). In discussions regarding this instruction, CSR' s counsel 
acknowledged that Defendant's Instruction No. 8, which became Final Instruction No. 6, 
"talks about having the ability to control Warm Creek Ranch." R. 1400:16-17. By 
stipulating to this jury instruction, CSR allowed the jury to be instructed that it is the law 
that CSR had a duty to act to prevent harm to others. 
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Instruction No. 6 also states that CSR had the ability to control WCR. The 
instruction stated, 
In determining whether Cedar Springs Ranch is negligent, you are instructed 
that Cedar Springs Ranch, as the landowner, has the ability to control Warm 
Creek Ranch's activity on the land. 
R. 763 (emphasis supplied). In CSR's closing statements, CSR's own attorney 
acknowledged and agreed that CSR, as the landowner, had the ability to control WCR's 
activity on the land. R. 1525:12-16. Thus, CSR's attorney not only stipulated to a jury 
instruction that stated that CSR had a duty, but also reminded the jury of this instruction 
during CSR's closing argument. CSR likewise allowed Instruction No. 7, which stated the 
two alternative duties at issue. R. 764; 1404:10-1409:6. Accordingly, CSR has no one to 
blame but itself that the jury followed Instruction Nos. 6 and 7. 
V. CSR'S LIABILITY IS NOT LIMITED TO A FINDING THAT CSR 
VIOLATED UTAH'S SAFETY LAW. 
CSR argues that it had no duty under the Safety Law, and for that reason, the jury's 
verdict is irreconcilably inconsistent. CSR's argument, however, ignores the fact that there 
were two separate grounds for finding CSR negligent. In closing, CSR's counsel advised 
the jury that it could find "[e]ither that Cedar Springs Ranch failed to exercise reasonable 
care in maintaining the fence, [or] that they violated a Utah safety law." R. 1522:2-4. As 
a result, the jury could find negligence under the Safety Law or CSR' s duty of "reasonable 
care in maintaining the fence to prevent cattle from coming onto the highway." R. 764. 
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The existence of CSR's independent duty to control its tenant can explain the trial 
court's denial of CSR's Directed Verdict Motion. The trial court did not state that CSR 
had a duty under the Safety Law, as CSR contends. Instead, the trial court stated, 
I do find that a landlord does have some duty to control the actions of its 
tenant, and I would say that at least in this case I would think that duty 
perhaps is slightly greater given the close interrelationship of the parties. 
R. 1310:23-1311 :2 ( emphasis supplied). This language shows that the trial court merely 
acknowledged that there was 'some duty,' whether from common law or from the Safety 
Law, and that the evidence presented in Liley's case-in-chief could lead a jury to find that 
CSR breached at least one of those duties. Thus, even if CSR did not have a duty under 
the Safety Law, the trial court's denial of CSR's Directed Verdict Motion, and the jury's 
verdict, are firmly grounded on CSR's alternative duty to control its tenant, as stated in 
Jury Instruction No. 6. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FIND THAT CSR WAS UNDER A 
GREATER DUTY THAN ANY OTHER LANDOWNER. 
CSR accuses the trial court of ruling that CSR "owed a greater duty" because both 
CSR and WCR were controlled by Dori us. Appellant's Brief at 1 and 10-11. The trial 
court never made any such ruling. The only mention of "a greater duty" by the trial court 
is the statement that "I would think that duty perhaps is slightly greater given the close 
interrelationship of the parties. R. 1310:23-1311 :2 ( emphasis supplied). There is no 
mention of any purported heightened duty in any of the jury instructions. Instead, the trial 
court's comment is directly in line with Jury Instruction No. 6, to which CSR had 
previously stipulated. R. 763; 1399:22-1400:9; 1302-1311. 
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VII. CSR FAILED TO PRESERVE ANY ISSUE AS TO THE CONSISTENCY OF 
THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
CSR failed to preserve any issues with regard to the integrity of the jury's verdict. 
In Utah, a party must make a timely and specific objection to the trial court's findings prior 
to challenging those findings on appeal. See 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 
72,151; T.H v. State, 2004 UT App 483, 19; MB. v. J.B., 2007 UT App 286, 1 11; Zavala 
v. Zavala, 2016 UT App 6,139 (quoting State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d 607,611 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993)). CSR never raised any objection or filed any motion with the trial court concerning 
the consistency of the jury's verdict, or the trial court's adoption of that verdict. Because 
of this fact, CSR has no right to appeal this issue. Yet even if CSR had preserved the issue, 
CSR has failed to carry its heavy burden of demonstrating that there is no possible way to 
reconcile the jury's findings with one another. Indeed, the jury's findings fit perfectly into 
the logical chain of questions set forth in the jury verdict fonn. As a result, there is no 
basis to disturb the jury's verdict in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
CSR attempts to escape the jury verdict against it by mischaracterizing the trial 
court's comments as dispositive rulings that the trial court never actually made, by 
attacking opening and closing statements that were never objected to at trial, and by 
suggesting that the jury verdict is inconsistent without identifying any actual inconsistency 
between any two specific findings. The truth of the matter is that the trial court's actual 
rulings correctly recognized that issues of material fact precluded summary judgment, and 
that Liley had presented sufficient evidence on those factual issues to require a jury trial. 
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Contrary to CSR's argument, Stephenson does not shield CSR from liability because the 
evidence consistently showed that the disrepair of the fence predated WCR's current 
tenancy on CSR's Property and CSR is the party that allowed the condition to exist. CSR 
argues that it has no liability under Utah's Safety Law, but Jury Instructions 6 and 7, to 
which CSR stipulated, provided an alternative common law duty that CSR also breached. 
Given Utah's established policy of only disturbing jury verdicts in the most exceptional of 
circumstances, and CSR' s failure to even preserve its issues for appeal, the Court should 
uphold the jury's verdict. Because CSR failed to marshal evidence when it was obligated 
to do so, CSR should be required to reimburse Liley for the cost of marshalling that 
.evidence. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should: (a) affirm the trial court's 
denial of CSR's Summary Judgment Motion; (b) affirm the trial court's denial of CSR's 
Motion for Directed Verdict; (c) affirm the jury's verdict; and (d) order CSR to reimburse 
Liley for any legal fees incurred by Liley to marshal evidence for this Court. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Liley respectfully requests oral argument on this appeal. 
DATED this 6th day of May, 2016. 
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:ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
















Ll-03-11 Filed: COMPLAINT 
ll-03-11 Filed: Complaint lOK-MORE 
ll-03-11 Filed: Demand Civil Jury 
Ll-03-11 Fee Account created 
Ll-03-11 Fee Account created 
Ll-03-11 Fee Payment 




)3-01-12 Filed: Notice of Dismissal of Defendant 
)3-05-12 Dismissed party - SANPETE COUNTY 
)3-12-12 Filed: ANSWER UDOT'S ANSWER TO FIRST AME 
)3-12-12 Filed: NOTICE OF UDOT'S JOINDER IN JUAB 
)3-12-12 Filed: Juab County's Answer to First Ame 
)3-12-12 Filed: Juab County's Motion to Change Ve 
)3-12-12 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Juab Cou 
)3-15-12 Filed: Juab County's Answer to Utah Depa 
)3-21-12 Filed: ANSWER DEFENDANT DORIUS' ANSWER T 
)3...;21-12 Filed: RETURN OF ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION 
)4-02-12 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision (J 
)4-02-12 Filed: Defendant Cedar Springs Ranch Ans 
)4-18-12 Filed: Order For Change of Venue Judge 
)4-30-12 Judge JAMES BRADY assigned. 
)4-30-12 Note: Case transferred from Salt Lake City District. Case# 
110918850 
)4-30-12 Filed: Complaint 
)5-03-12 Filed: Notice of Withdrawal _of Counsel 
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:ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
)5-03-12 Filed: Certificate of Service 
)5-07-12 Filed: Notice to Appear or Appoint Co~nsel 
)5-08-12 Filed: NOTICE TO APPEAR PERSONALLY OR APPOINT LEGAL COUNSEL 
)5-08-12 Filed: NOTICE TO APPEAR OR APPOINT COUNSEL 
~ )5-25-12 Filed: Notice of Entry of Appearance 
)6-21-12 Filed: Motion for Rule 16 (b) Scheduling Conference 
Filed by: UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTAT, 
)6-26-12 Notice - NOTICE for Case 120600012 ID 14596276 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 07/03/2012 
Time: 01:04 p.rn. 
Location: 2ND FLOOR, ROOM #1 
160 NORTH MAIN 
NEPHI, UT 84648 
Before Judge: JAMES BRADY 
)6-26-12 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on July 03, 2012 at 01:04 PM i~ 
Juab County Court with Judge BRADY. 
)6-26-12 Filed: Notice of Scheduling Conference 
)6-28-12 TELEPHONIC SCHEDULING CONF. scheduled on July 03, 2012 at 01:04 
PM in Juab County Court with Judge BRADY. 
)6-28-12 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE Modified. 
Reason: Correct calendar 
~ )6-28-12 Filed: NOTE: THIS IS A TELEPHONIC SCHEDULING CONFERENCE. WRONA 
LAW FIRM WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH PARTIES AS TO HOW CONFERENCE 
WILL BE INITIATED. 
)6-29-12 TELEPHONIC SCHEDULING CONF. scheduled on July 03, 2012 at 01:00 
PM in Juab County Court with Judge BRADY. 
)7-03-12 Minute Entry - Minutes for TELEPHONIC SCHEDULING CO~F. 
Judge: JAMES BRADY 
Clerk: taunyag 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney{s): S BROOK MILLARD 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOEL A FERRE 
KATHLEEN M LIUZZI 
Other Parties: RUTH A SHAPIRO 
Audio 
Tape Count: 1:08:00 
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:ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
HEARING 
Attorney Jennifer D. Reyes is excused from appearing today. Ms. 
Reyes is attending another court hearing and indicated she 
stipulates to the requests being made today. 
Attorney Millard advises the Court that he is new counsel for the 
Plaintiff and that he and defense counsel met regarding this matter 
on Thursday, June 28, 2012. The parties have stipulated to URCP 
26. 
1 Disclosure and Discovery Requirements being in effect beginning 
June 28, 2012. 
Court accepts the stipulation as discussed. 
)7-16-12 Filed: Certificate of Service 
)7-31-12 Filed: NOTICE OF INTENT TO SERVE SUBPOENAS 
)8-08-12 Filed: Certificate of Service of Defendant Dale Dorius's 
Initial Disclosures 
)8-08-12 Filed: CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE: UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION'S INITIAL DISCLOSURES· 
)8-08-12 Filed: RETURN OF ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION 
)8-13-12 Filed: Certificate of Service of Juab County's Initial 
Disclosures 
)8-17-12 Filed: Initial Disclosures of Defendant Cedar Springs Ranch, 
Inc 
)8-17-12 Filed: Certificate of Service for Initial Disclosures of 
Defendant, Cedar Springs Ranch, Inc 
)8-23-12 Filed: CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE : INTERROGATORIES 1-18 
AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 1-14 TO PLAINTIFF 
)8-23-12 Filed: RETURN OF ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION 
)8-31-12 Filed: Certificate of Service of Defendant Dale Darius's First 
Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents 
to Co-Defendant Cedar Springs Ranch Inc. 
)9-25-12 Filed: Certificate of Service of Cedar Springs Ranch Inc. 's 
Answer to First Set of Interrogatories and Req~est for 
Production of Documents 
)9-27-12 Filed: CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
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;ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
)9-27-12 Filed: RETURN OF ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION 
L0-01-12 Filed: Certificate of Service of Responses to Interrogatories 
1-18 and Requests for Production of Documents 1-14- to 
Plaintiff 
~ L0-05-12 Filed: Certificate of Service of Amended Responses to Requests 
for Production of Documents 1-14 to Plaintiff 
L0-09-12 Filed: Certificate of Service of Defendant Cedar Springs Ranch 
Inc. 's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production 
of Documents 
~ L0-12-12 Filed: Notice of Withdrawal of Knute A. Rife as Counsel for 
Plaintiff 
L0-25-12 Filed: Certificate of Service of Defendant Dale Dorius' First 
Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents 
to Plaintiff 
Ll-08-12 Filed: CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT 
CEDAR SPRINGS RANCH'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF 
Ll-08-12 Filed: RETURN OF ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION 
l2-03-12 Filed: NOTICE OF DEPOSITION - PATRICK LILEY 
L2-03-12 Filed: NOTICE OF DEPOSITION - FRANK PIPPY 
LZ-03-12 Filed: NOTICE OF DEPOSITION [DAVID VIGOS] 
L2-03-12 Filed: RETURN OF ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION 
L2-03-12 Filed: RETURN OF ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION 
~ L2-03-12 Filed: RETURN OF ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION 
L2-21-12 Filed: CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT 
DALE DORIOS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
l2-21-12 Filed: RETURN OF ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION 
L2-26-12 Filed return: RETURN OF SERVICE upon DAVID VIGOS for 
Party Served: UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTAT 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: December 19, 2012 
L2-26-12 Filed: RETURN OF ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION 
)1-02-13 Filed: NOTICE OF INTENT TO SERVE SUBPOENAS 
)1-02-13 Filed: RETURN OF ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION 
)1-17-13 Filed: AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF FRANK PIPPY 
)1-17-13 Filed: RETURN OF ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION 
I.Jd )1-25-13 Filed: Stipulated Motion to Dismiss Juab County 
Filed by: JUAB COUNTY, 
?rinted: 05/06/16 09:52:18 Page 5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
)1-30-13 Filed order: Order Dismissing Juab County 
Judge JAMES BRADY 
Signed January 29, 2013 
)2-05-13 Filed: CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE OF DEFENDANT DALE DORIUS' 
SECOND SET OF REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMEN7S 
)2-06-13 Filed: NOTICE OF CONTINUED DEPOSITION OF FRANK PIPPY 
)2-06-13 Filed: RETURN OF ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION 
)2-12-13 Filed: AMENDED NOTICE OF CONTINUED DEPOSITION OF FRANK PIPPY 
)2-12-13 Filed: RETURN OF ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION 
)2-21-13 Filed: CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO 
DEFENDANT DALE DORIUS' FIRS~ SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST 
FOR DOCUMENTS 
)2-21-13 Filed: CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO 
DEFENDANT DALE DORIUS' SECOND SET OF REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS 
)2-21-13 Filed: RETURN OF ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION 
)3-05-13 Filed: CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE: UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION'S SUPPLEMENTAL INITIAL DISCLOSURES 
)3-05-13 Filed: RETURN OF ELECTRONIC·NOTIFICATION 
)4-09-13 Filed: Other Notice of Deposition of Jared Jensen 
)4-09-13 Filed: Other Notice of Deposition of Dale Dorius 
)4-09-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)4-29-13 Filed: Certificate of Mailing/Service : Utah Department of 
Transportation's Supplemental Initial Disclosures 
)4-29-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)5-06-13 Filed: Certificate of Mailing/Service Plaintiff's First 
Supplemental Initial Disclosures 
)5-06-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)5-16-13 Filed: Certificate of Mailing/Service : Utah Department of 
Transportation's Third Supplemental Initial Disclosures 
)5-16-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)8-27-13 Filed: Certificate of Mailing/Service Plaintiff~s Second 
Supplemental Initial Disclosures 
)8-27-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)8-29-13 Filed: Declaration of Jackie Christensen 
)8-29-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)9-12-13 Filed: Certificate of Mailing/Service Plaintiff's Third 
Supplemental Initial Disclosures 
)9-12-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
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;ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
)1-02-14 Filed: Appearance of Counsel 
)1-02-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)1-16-14 Filed: Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Filed by: DORIUS, DALE 
~ )1-16-14 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
v, 
Judgment (Hearing Requested) 
)1-16-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)1-16-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-18-14 Filed: Memorandum In Opposition to Defendant Dale Doriuss . 
Motion 
)2-18-14 Filed: Exhibits A - E to Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant 
Dale Doriuss Motion 
)2-18-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-25-14 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Dale Doriuss 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
)2-25-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-25-14 Filed: Request/Notice to Submit Defendants Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
)2-25-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-11-14 Filed: Notice of Hearing 
)3-11-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-28-14 MOTION HEARING scheduled on May 20, 2014 at 01:30 PM in Juab 
County Court with Judge BRADY. 
)5-28-14 Filed: Order (Proposed} Granting Defendant Dale Doriuss Motio:1 
for Summary Judgment 
)5-28-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)5-29-14 Filed order: Order Granting Defendant Dale Doriuss Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Judge JAMES BRADY 
Signed May 29, 2014 
)5-29-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)5-30-14 Note: All claims against Defendant Dale Dor!us are dismissed 
with prejudice. 
)5-30-14 Minute Entry - Minutes for ORAL ARGUMENTS 
Judge: JAMES BRADY 
Clerk: taunyag 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): S BROOK MILLA..~D 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOEL A FERRE 
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:ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
TANNER A STRICKLAND LENA~T 
Audio 
Tape Count: 1:38:33 
HEARING 
This matter is before the court for Oral Arguments on Defendant 
Dale Darius's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Arguments are given by Attorney Tanner S. Lenart and Attorney S. 
Brook Millard. Court grants Motion for Summary Judgment and 
outlines ruling. Defense counsel, Tanners. Lenart to prepare the 
order. 
)8-11-14 Filed: Nqtice for Case 120600012 ID 16111713 
)8-11-14 Notice - NOTICE for Case 120600012 ID 16111743 
FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 09/09/2014 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Juab County Court 
102 East 200 North 
NEPHI, UT 84648 
Before Judge: JAMES BRADY 
The Court directs all remaining parties to attend. Fai:ure of a~y 
party to attend may result in entry of default of that party, or 
dismissal of that party's claims. 
)8-11-14 FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on September 09, 2014 at 
02:00 PM in Juab County Court with Judge BRADY. 
)8-11-14 Filed: Notice for Case 120600012 ID 16111743 
)8-25-14 Filed: Notice of Intent to Allocate Fault to Warm Creek Ranch 
Corp. 
)8-25-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notificatio~ 
)8-27-14 Filed: Certificate of Service of UDOTs Fourth S~pplemental 
Initial Disclosures 
)8-27-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)9-03-14 Filed: Certificate of Service of UDOTs Expert Wit~ess 
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:ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
Designation 
)9-03-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)9-04-14 Filed: Certificate of Service of Plaintiffs Fourth Supp 
Disclosure 
I.ii) )9-04-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)9-09-14 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference 
Judge: JAMES BRADY 
Clerk: taunyag 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): S BROOK MILLARD 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JENNIFER D REYES 
JOEL A FERRE 
Audio 
Tape Count: 2:00:50 
HEARING 
Status of case is discussed. Counsel stipulate to co~plete 
Mediation by November 21, 2014. 
Counsel request a 3-day Jury Trial be scheduled. 
Motion in Lirnine will be filed by counsel. 
Trial Order will be mailed out to the part~es. 
JURY TRIAL is scheduled. 
Date: 03/03/2015 
Time: 09:00 a.rn. 
Location: Juab County Court 
102 East 200 North 
NEPHI, UT 84648 
Before Judge: JAMES BRADY 
JORY TRIAL is scheduled. 
Date: 03/04/2015 
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~ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Juab County Court 
102 East 200 North 
NEPHI, UT 84648 
Before Judge: JAMES BRADY 
JURY TRIAL is scheduled. 
Date: 03/05/2015 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Juab County Court 
102 East 200 North 
NEPHI, OT 84648 
Before Judge: JAMES BRADY 
PRE~RIAL CONFERENCE. 
Date: 02/03/2015 
Time: 01:00 p.m. 
Location: Juab County Court 
102 East 200 North 
NEPHI, UT 84648 
Before Jud~e: JAMES BRADY 
Motions submitted on or before 01/06/2015. 
)9-09-14 JURY TRIAL scheduled on March 03, 2015 at 
County Court with Judge BROWN. 
)9-09-14 JURY TRIAL scheduled on March 04, 2015 at 
County Court with Judge BROWN. 
)9-09-14 JURY TRIAL scheduled on March 05, 2015 at 
County Court with Judge BROWN. 
)9-09-14 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled o~ February 
in Juab County Court with Judge BRADY. 
)9-09-14 Filed order: Trial Order 
Judge JAMES BRADY 
Signed September 09, 2014 
)9-16-14 Filed order: Amended Trial Order 
Judge JAMES BRADY 
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:ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
Signed September 16, 2014 
L0-14-14 Filed: Mediation Disposition Notice 
L0-14-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
Ll-19-14 Filed: Certificate of Service of UDOTs Fifth Supplemental 
Initial Disclosures 
Ll-19-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
L2-02-14 Filed: Motion: Defendant Cedar Springs Ranch, Ines., Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Dismissal 
Filed by: CEDAR SPRINGS RANCH INC, 




Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissal 
L2-02-14 Filed: Exhibit List 
LZ-02-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
l2-22-14 Filed: : Notice of Intent to Allocate Fault to Warm Creek Ranch 
Corporation 
L2-22-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
L2-24-14 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Cedar Springs Ranch Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
L2-24-14 Filed: Exhibit 1 to Memorandum in Opposition to Cedar Springs 
Ranch Motion for Summary Judgment 
l2-24-14 Filed: Exhibit 2 to Memorandum in Opposition to Cedar Springs 
Ranch Motion for Summary Judgment 
L2-24-14 Filed: Exhibit 3 to Memorandum in Opposition to Cedar Springs 
Ranch Motion for Summary Judgment 
L2-24-14 Filed: Exhibit 4 to Memorandum in Opposition to Cedar Springs 
Ranch Motion for Summary Judgment 
L2-24-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)1-06-15 Filed: Certificate of Service of UDOTs Sixth Supplemental 
Initial Disclosures 
)1-06-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 











Return of Electronic Notification 
Reply Memorandum In S~pport of Defendant Cedar Spr~ngs 
Motion for Sumary Judgment and Dismissal 
Return of Electronic Not~fication 
Filed: Memorandum Defendant UDOTs Memorandum Opposing 
Plaintiffs Motion to Preclude David Vigos from Testify~ng About 
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:ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
Plaintiffs Mental Alertness 
)1-13-15 Filed: Exhibit A- Deposition of Jean David Vigos (Relevant 
Portions) 
)1-13-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)1-16-15 Filed: Jury Instructions Stipulated Courts Stock Preliminary 
Jury Instructions 
)1-16-15 Filed: Stipulated Special Ve~dict Form 
)1-16-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)1-23-15 Filed: Memorandum of Defendant Cedar Springs Ranch Ines in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Preclude David Vigos From 
Testifying About Plaintiffs Mental Alertness 
)1-23-15 Filed: Exhibits 1-9 to Memorandum of Defendant Cedar Springs 
Ranch Ines in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Preclude David 
Vigos From Testifying About Plaintiffs Mental Alertness 
)1-23-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)1-23-15 Filed: Jury Instructions Defendant State of Utahs Proposed Jury 
Instructions 
)1-23-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)1-29-15 Filed: Request/Notice to Submit: Notice to Submit for Decision 
)1-29-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)1-29-15 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE rescheduled to February 03, 2015 at 01:03 
PM in Juab County Court with Judge BRADY. 
)2-02-15 Filed: Notice of Judicial Assignment of a Senior Judge 
)2-02-15 Filed: Certificate of Service- Utah Department of 
Transportations Pretrial Disclosures 
)2-02-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-03-15 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference 
Judge: DONALD J EYRE 
Clerk: raelenec 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): S BROOK MILLARD 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOEL A FERRE 
JENNIFER D REYES 
Audio 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: l:21/1:39 
This matter comes before the Court for Pretrial co~ference. Mr. 
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~ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
Ferre addresses the Court regarding the trial dates a~d requests 
they remain as scheduled. 
Court and counsel discuss trial issues (exhibits, number of j~rors 
to call, etc.). 
Pending motions will be submitted to Judge Brown for consideration. 
End Time: 1:48 pm 
)2-04-15 Filed: Certificate of Service of Plaintiffs Pretrial 
Disclosures 
)2-04-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 










of Defendant Cedar Springs Ranch Inc.s Pre-Trial Disclosures 
Filed:. Return of Electronic Notification 
Filed: : Subpoena 
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
Filed: Subpoena to Trooper Jared Jensen (with Return of· 
Service) 
Filed: Subpoena to Jacki Christensen (with Return of Service) 
Filed: Subpoena to David Vigos (with Constables Proof of 
Service) 
Filed: Objection to Plaintiffs Pre-Trial Disclosures 
Filed: Objection to Defendant Cedar Springs Ranchs Pre-Trial 
Disclosures 
Filed: Certificate cf Mailing/Service: Certificate of Service 
of Subpoena 
)2-12-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-12-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-12-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-12-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-12-15 Judge JENNIFER A BROWN assigned. 
)2-17-15 Filed return: Return of Service upon J~~~ DAVID VIGOS for 
Party Served: PATRICK LILEY 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: February 12, 2015 
i.:iP )2-17-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-18-15 Filed: Subpoena to Dale Dorius {with Sheriffs Proof of Service) 
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:ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
)2-18-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-19-15 Filed: Request/Notice to Submit Plaintiffs Motion In Limine to 
Preclude David Vigos from Testifying About Plaint~ffs Menta: 
Alertness 
)2-19-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notificatio~ 
)2-23-15 Filed: Defendant State of Utahs Proposed Voir Dire of the Jury 
Venire 
)2-23-15 Filed: Exhibit A- Proposed Voir Dire Examination of the Venire 
)2-23-15 Filed: Exhibit 8- Courts Modified Jury Voir Dire Examination of 
the Venire 
)2-23-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-24-15 Filed: PLAINTIFF PATRICK LILEYS PROPOSED VOIR DIRE OF THE JURY 
VENIRE 
)2-24-15 Filed: Exhibit 1 
)2-24-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
·)3-03-15 Minute Entry - Minutes for Jury Trial 
Judge: JENNIFER A BROWN 
Clerk: raelenec 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): PATRICK LILEY 
Defendant(s): DALE DORIUS 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): S BROOK MILLARD 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOEL A FERRE 
JENNIFER D REYES 
TANNER A STRICKLAND LENART 
Audio 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 9:21 
This matter comes before the Court for day one of jury trial. 
Court and counsel meet in chambers off the record regarding the 
pending motions. Court makes findings and denies the motion for 
summary judgment, denies the motion to preclude testimony of David 
Vigos, as to the State's Objections to Plaintiff's pre-trial 
disclosures the highway patrol report is reserved, affidavit of 
Tony Dick is excluded, photographs of fence/scene are al:owed with 
foundation, photographs of cattle are excluded, Juab County Sheriff 
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~ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
records are excluded, and as to the State's Objections to Cedar 
Springs' Ranch pre-trial disclosures the highway patrol report is 
reserved, photographs of fence/scene are allowed with foundation 
and deposition transcripts are excluded. 
TIME: 9:21 AM Jurors are welcomed and tha~ked for their patience 
and appearance. 
TIME: 9:25 AM Potential jurors are sworn in. Voir dire begins. 
TIME: 9:43 AM Court takes a brief recess. 
TIME: 9:57 AM Voir dire continues in chambers. 
TIME: 11:47 AM Court resumes in the court room. Jurors selected to 
serve on the case: 1-2, 2-3, 3-12, 4-13, 5-14, 6-17, 7-18, 8-23 and 
9-24. 
TIME: 11:50 AM Remaining jurors are thanked and excused. 
TIME: 11:50 AM Jurors are seated and given the oath for trial 
jurors. 
TIME: 11:52 AM Preliminary Instructions are read to the jury by the 
Court. 
TIME: 12:11 PM Jurors are excused for the lunch recess. J~rors 
admonished by the Court as to their conduct during the lunch break 
and instructed to return at 1:00 p~. 
TIME: 12:12 PM Court is in recess. 
TIME: 1:10 PM Court reconvenes with the jury and counsel for both 
parties present. Mr. Millard gives opening arguments. 
TIME: 1:29 PM Mr. Ferre gives opening arguments. 
TIME: 1:36 PM Ms. Reyes gives opening arguments. 
?rinted: 05/06/16 09:52:19 ?age 15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
TIME: 1:42 PM Patrick Liley is sworn in and directed by Mr. 
Millard. 
TIME: 2:30 PM Exhibit 6 is marked a~d identified. 
TIME: 2:48 PM Exhibits 1 and 2 are marked, ident:fied and received. 
TIME: 2:53 PM Exhibit 7 is marked, identified and received. 
TIME: 2:58 PM Exhibit 3 is marked, identified and received. 
TIME: 3:04 PM Court takes a brief recess. 
TIME: 3:27 PM Court reconvenes with the j~ry and counsel for both 
parties present. Mr. Ferre cross examines the witness. 
TIME: 3:45 PM Exhibit 34 is marked, identified and received. 
TIME: 4:02 PM Ms. Reyes cross examines the witness. 
TIME: 4:13 PM Mr. Millard redirects the witness. 
TIME: 4:27 PM Witness is excused. 
TIME: 4:29 PM Austin Liley is sworn in and directed by Mr. Millard. 
TIME: 4:42 PM Mr. Strickland Lenart cross examines the witness. 
TIME: 4:46 PM Exhibit 43 is marked, identified and received. 
TIME: 4:48 PM Ms. Reyes cross examines the witness. 
TIME: 4:52 PM Mr. Millard redirects the witness. 
TIME: 4:53 PM Witness is excused. 
TIME: 4:54 PM Court in recess. Jurors are instr~cted and 
admonished to be present tomorrow morning at 8:30 am. 
)3-03-15 Filed: Jury Questionnaires 1-3 and 6-31 
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:ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
)3-03-15 Filed order: Court's Stock Preliminary Jury Instructions 
Judge JENNIFER A BROWN 
Signed March 03, 2015 
)3-03-15 Filed: Peremptory List 
'-' )3-04-15 Minute Entry - Minutes for JURY TRIAL DAY 2 
Judge: JENNIFER A BROWN 
Clerk: taunyag 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): PATRICK LILEY 
Defendant(s): DALE DORIUS 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): S BROOK MILLARD 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOEL A FERRE 
JENNIFER D REYES 
TANNER A STRICKLAND LENART 
Audio 
Tape Count: 8:37:00 
Court reconvenes with the jury and counsel for all parties being 
present. Mr. Millard advises the Court regarding the exhibit 
7-maps were shown to a representative of UDOT and they stipulate 
that the maps marked are the same maps shown o~ the projector 
yesterday in open court. 
TIME: 8:43 AM David Ellis Edmonds is sworn and exa~ined by 
counsel. 
TIME: 8:51 AM Frank Norris Pippy is sworn and examined by counsel. 
Some photos from exhibit 6 are shown and identified by the wit~ess. 
Witness opens and reads from his deposition. 
TIME: 10:09 AM Court in recess for the morning break. 
TIME: 10:32 AM Court reconvenes with the j~ry and counsel for all 
parties being present. 
vb TIME: 10:33 AM Lia Pretorius is sworn and examined by counsel Mr. 
Millard only. 
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;ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
TIME: 10:42 AM Trooper Jared Allen Jensen is sworn and examined by 
counsel. Witness opens and reads from his deposition. 
TIME: 11:03 AM Defendant Dale M. Dorius is sworn and examined by 
counsel. Exhibit 5 is stipulated to by counsel and received. 
Exhibit 5 is marked and identified. Some photos from exhibit 6 are 
shown and identified by the witness. 
TIME: 11:32 AM Court in a short recess at the request of the 
plaintiff counsel. 
TIME: 11:45 AM Counsel met in chambers to take up matters outside 
the presence of the jurors. 
TIME: 11:55 AM Court in recess for the lunch break. 
TIME: 12:56 PM Court reconvenes with the jury and counsel for all 
parties being present. Robert Westover is sworn and examined by 
counsel. Exhibit 32 is marked, identified and received. Attorney 
Ferre reserves this witness. 
TIME: 1:16 PM Plaintiff rests. The jury is excused to take up 
matters outside of their presence. 
TIME: 1:17 PM Mr. Ferre argues motion for directed verdict on 
behalf of defendant, Utah Department of Transportation. Mr. 
Millard responds. Mr. Ferre gives reb~ttal and submits the ~otion. 
TIME: 1:34 PM The Court outlines ruling and grants the motion for 
the directed verdict. Mr. Ferre to submit order. 
TIME: 1:37 PM Ms. Reyes argues motion for directed verdict on 
behalf of defendants, Dale Dorius and Cedar Springs Ranch :nc. Mr. 
Millard responds. Ms. Reyes gives rebuttal and submits the ~otion. 
TIME: 1:48 PM The Court outlines ruling and denies the ~otion for 
the directed verdict. 
TIME: 1:50 PM Ms. Reyes advises the Court regarding Warm Spring 
Ranch. Corrections to the Jury Instructions are discussed. 
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:ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
TIME: 1:55 PM Jurors brought back into the courtroo~. Jurors are 
advised of the dismissal of the party, Utah Department of 
Transportation. 
TIME: 2:01 PM Dr. Jean David Vigos is sworn and exa~i~ed by 
counsel. Witness opens and reads from his deposition. Some photos 
from exhibit 6 are shown and identified by the witness. 
TIME: 2:44 PM Instruction given to the Jury regarding statements 
from last witness. 
TIME: 2:47 PM The jury is excused for afternoon break and for 
counsel to take up matters outside of their presence. 
TIME: 2:48 PM Ms. Reyes advises the Court and req~ests judicial 
notice of case #140907265. Mr. Millard responds. 
TIME: 2:58 PM Court takes matter under advisement. Court in 
recess. 
TIME: 4:02 PM Court outlines ruling. 
TIME: 4:05 PM Court in recess. 
TIME: 4:27 PM Court reconvenes with the jury and cou~sel for all 
parties being present. Plaintiff is sworn and examined by counsel. 
Exhibit la is marked, identified and received. 
TIME: 4:54 PM Defense rests. 
TIME: 4:55 PM Jurors are excused for the day and admonished by the 
Court. 
TIME: 4:56 PM Court in recess. 
TIME: 5:17 PM Court reviews the proposed jury instructions i~ 
chambers with counsel. 
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:ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
TIME: 6:11 PM Court in recess for the day. 
TIME: 8:37:00 
)3-05-15 Filed order: Final Jury Instructions 
Judge JENNIFER A BROWN 
Signed March 05, 2015 
)3-05-15 Filed: Verdict Form 
)3-05-15 Notice - Final Exhibit List 
)3-05-15 Minute Entry - Minutes for JORY TRIAL DAY 3 
Judge: JENNIFER A BROWN 
Clerk: raelenec 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): PATRICK LILEY 
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:ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
Defendant(s): DALE DORIUS 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): S BROOK MILLARD 
. Defendant's Attorney(s): JENNIFER D REYES 
Audio 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 8:38 
This matter comes before the Court for day three of jury trial. 
Court and counsel meet in chambers and discuss the final jury 
instructions. 
TIME: 8:51 AM Court takes a brief recess. 
TIME: 9:29 AM Court resumes with counsel present. Court a~d 
counsel agree upon the final instructions prepared. 
TIME: 9:30 AM Jurors enter the court room. Court reads the final 
jury instructions to the jury panel. 
TIME: 9:53 AM Mr. Millard gives closing arguments. 
TIME: 11:02 AM Ms. Reyes gives closing arguments. 
TIME: 11:36 AM Court and counsel have a sidebar discussion at the 
bench. 
TIME: 11:43 AM Mr. Millard gives rebuttal arguments. 
TIME: 12:04 PM Alternate juror is thanked and excused. 
TIME: 12:06 PM Bailiff is sworn in. Jurors are excused to 
deliberate. 
TIME: 12:07 PM Court is in recess. 
TIME: 2:45 PM Court resumes with the jurors present. 
TIME: 2:46 PM Verdict is read in open court by the clerk. 
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~ASE NUMBER 120600012 Personal Injury 
TIME: 2:50 PM Jurors are excused and thanked for their service. 
TIME: 2:52 PM Court is in recess. 
TIME: 8:38 
)3-05-15 Filed: Signed Exhibit List 
)3-06-15 Filed: Judgment (Proposed) Judgment on Jury Verdict 
)3-06-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-10-15 Filed: Certificate of Service-Order Granting UDOTs Motion for 
Directed Verdict 
)3-10-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-20-15 Filed: Order (Proposed} Gra~ting Utah Department of 
Transportations Motion for Directed Verdict 
)3-20-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-20-15 Filed judgment: Judgment on Jury Verdict 
Judge JENNIFER A BROWN 
Signed March 20, 2015 
)3-20-15 Judgment #1 Entered$ 259199.00 
Debtor: CEDAR SPRINGS RANCH INC 
Creditor: PATRICK LILEY 
259,199.00 Principal 
259,199.00 Judgment Grand Total 
)3-20-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-20-15 Case Disposition is Judgment 
Disposition Judge is JENNIFER A BROWN 
)3-20-15 Filed order: Order Granting Utah Department of Transportations 
Motion for Directed Verdict 
Judge JENNIFER A BROWN 
Signed March 20, 2015 
)3-20-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-25-15 Filed: Notice of Entry o( Judgment on Jury Verdict 
)3-25-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-27-15 Filed: Memorandum.of Costs Motion for Memorandum of Costs and 
Disbursements 
)3-27-15 Filed: Declaration of S. Brook Millard and Verification in 
Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Costs and Mernorandumin Support 
of Costs and Disbursements 
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\cf )3-27-15 Filed: Return of Elect:::-onic Notification 
)3-30-15 Filed: Memorandum of Costs 
)3-30-15 Filed: Certificate of Service-UDOTs Verified Memorandum of 
Costs 
~ )3-30-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)4-02-15 Filed: Notice of Appeal - Civil (not Interlocutory) 
)4-02-15 Fee Account created Total Due: 225.00 
)4-02-15 APPEAL Payment Received: 225.00 
)4-02-15 F.iled: Return of Electronic Notification 
~ )4-03-15 Note: Notice of Appeal sent to COA via email. 
)4-07-15 Filed: New Appeal Letter from the Supreme Co~rt - Appellate 
Case No. 20150267 
)4-07-15 Filed: Order from the Supreme Court 
)4-28-15 Filed: Letter of assignment from the Court of Appeals 
)4-28-15 Note: Appealed: Case 120150267 
)5-19-15 Filed: Motion for Supplemental Proceeding 
Filed by: LILEY, PATRICK 
)5-19-15 Filed: Order (Proposed) Order in Supple~ental Proceeding 
)5-19-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)5-19-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)5-20-15 Filed order: Order in Supplemental Proceeding 
Judge JENNIFER A BROWN 
Signed May 20, 2015 
~ )5-20-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)5-31-15 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 03-03-2015 
)5-31-15 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 03-04-2015 
)5-31-15 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 03-05-2015 
)6-04-15 Note: Transcripts of Jury Trial 3/3/15, 3/4/15 & 3/5/15 
received by the court. 
)6-04-15 Filed return: Return of Service -Affidavit of Process Server 
(Order in Supplemental Proceeding-Heari~g on 6/30/15 at 1:00 
p.rn.) upon DALE DORIUS, REGISTERED AGENT for 
Party Served: CEDAR SPRINGS RANCH INC 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: May 27, 2015 
)6-04-15 Filed: Ex. A - Order in Supplemental Proceeding 
)6-04-15 Filed: Return of Electron~c Notification 
vj )6-11-15 Filed: Motion to Continue Order to Show Ca~se Hearing Scheduled 
for June 30, 2015 
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Filed by: CEDAR SPRINGS RANCH INC, 
)6-11-15 Filed: Order (Proposed) on Motion to Continue Order to Show 
Cause Hearing Schedule for June 30, 2015 
)6-11-15 Filed: Return.6f Electronic Notification 
)6-18-15 SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER rescheduled to June 30, 2015 at :2:59 PM in 
Juab County Court·with Judge BROWN. 
)6-23-15 Note: Reason: Counsel's request. Stipulatio~ of counsel motion. 
)6-23-15 SUPPLEMENTA~ ORDER scheduled on August 18, 2015 at 01:00 PM in 
Juab County Court with Judge BROWN. 
)6-25-15 Filed order: Order on Motion to Continue Order to Show Cause 
Hearing Schedule for June 30, 2015 
Judge JENNIFER A BROWN 
Signed June 25, 2015 
)6-25-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)8-10-15 Filed: Motion for Stay Pending Appeal 
Filed by: CEDAR SPRINGS RANCH INC, 
)8-10-15 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion for Stay Pending Appeal 
)8-10-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)8-17-15 SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER continued without dat. 
Reason: Counsel's request. 
L2-22-15 Filed: Judgment Roll and Index and Clerk's Certificate 
L2-22-15 Note: Judgment Roll and Index and Clerk's Certificate emailed 
to the Court of Appeals. Advised the Court of Appeals 
that the Record had been uploaded into Google under D4. 
Gave a box to Robyn B. with Exhibits (1 Black Binder) to 
send through State Mail 
L2-22-15 Note: Tracking #55500156765. 
)4-20-16 Filed: Abstract of Judgment - To Issue (Proposed) 
)4-20-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)4-21-16 Issued: Abstract of Judgment Issued 
Clerk raelenec 
)4-21-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)4-29-16 Fee Account created Total Due: 3.00 
)4-29-16 Fee Account created Total Due: 8.00 
)4-29-16 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.49 
)4-29-16 CERTIFIED COPIES Payment Received: 
Note: POSTAGE-COPIES 
)4-29-16 CERTIFICATION Payme:-it Received: 
)4-29-16 POSTAGE-COPIES Payment Received: 
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Utah Code 
Effective 5/1212015 
41-6a-407 Livestock on highway -- Restrictions -- Collision, action for damages. 
(1) 
(a) A person who owns or is in possession or control of any livestock may not willfully or 
negligently permit any of the livestock to stray or remain unaccompanied on a highway, if both 
sides of the highway are separated from adjoining property by a fence, wall, hedge, sidewalk, 
curb, lawn, or building. 
(b) Subsection (1 )(a) does not apply to range stock drifting onto any highway moving to or from 
their accustomed ranges. 
(2) 
(a) A person may not drive any livestock upon, over, or across any highway during the period 
from half an hour after sunset to half an hour before sunrise. 
(b) Subsection (2)(a) does not apply if the person has a sufficient number of herders with warning 
lights on continual duty to open the road to permit the passage of vehicles. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (1) or (2) is an infraction. 
(4) In any civil action brought for damages caused by collision with any domestic animal or 
livestock on a highway, there is no presumption that the collision was due to negligence on 
behalf of the owner or the person in possession of the domestic animal or livestock. 
Amended by Chapter 412, 2015 General Session 
Page 1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum3 
@ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 




4TH DISTRICT COURT - JUAB 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MINUTES 
JURY TRIAL 
vs. Case No: 120600012 PI 




Plaintiff(s): PATRICK LILEY 
Defendant(s): DALE DORIUS 
Et al, 
Plaintiff's Attorney{s): S BROOK MILLARD 
Defendant's Attorney{s): JOEL A FERRE 
JENNIFER D REYES 
Judge: 
Date: 
TANNER A STRICKLAND LENART 
Audio 




This matter comes before the Court for day one of jury t=ial. 
A BROWN 
2015 
Court and counsel meet in chambers off the record regardir.g the ·pending motions. Court 
makes findings and denies the motion for summary judgment, denies the motion to 
preclude testimony of David Vigos, as to the State's Objections to Plaintiff's 
pre-trial disclosures the highway patrol report is reserved, affidavit of Tony Dick is 
excluded, photographs of fence/scene are allowed with fot:ndation, photographs of ca~tle 
are excluded, Juab County Sheriff records are excluded, and as to the State's 
Objections to Cedar Springs' Rar.ch pre-trial disclosures the highway patrol report is 
reserved, photographs of fence/scene are allowed with foundation and deposition 
transcripts are excluded. 
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Case No: 120600012 Date: Mar 03, 2015 
TIME: 9:21 AM Jurors are welcomed and thanked for their patience and appearance. 
TIME: 9:25 AM Potential jurors are sworn in. Voir dire begins. 
TIME: 9:43 AM Court takes a brief recess. 
TIME: 9:57 AM Vair dire continues in chambers. 
TIME: 11:47 AM Court resumes in the court room. Jurors selected to serve on the case: 
1-2, 2-3, 3-12, 4-13, 5-14, 6-17, 7-18, 8-23 and 9-24. 
TIME: 11:50 AM Remaining jurors are thanked and excused. 
TIME: 11:50 AM Jurors are seated and given the oath for trial jurors. 
TIME: 11:52 AM Preliminary Instructions are read to the jury by the Court. 
TIME: 12:11 PM Jurors are excused for the lunch recess. Jurors admonished by the Court 
as.to their conduct during the lunch break and instructed to return at 1:00 pm. 
TIME: 12:12 PM Court is in recess. 
TIME: 1:10 PM Court reconvenes with the jury and counsel for both parties present, Mr. 
Millard gives opening arguments, 
TIME: 1:29 PM Mr. Ferre gives opening arguments. 
TIME: 1:36 PM Ms. Reyes gives opening arguments. 
TIME: 1:42 PM Patrick Liley is sworn in and directed by Mr. Millard.· 
TIME: 2:30 PM Exhibit 6 is marked and identified. 
TIME: 2:48 PM Exhibits 1 and 2 are marked, identified and received. 
TIME: 2:53 PM Exhibit 7 is marked, identified and received. 
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Case No: 120600012 Date: Mar 03, 2015 
TIME: 2:58 PM Exhibit 3 is marked, identified and received. 
TIME: 3:04 PM Court takes a brief recess. 
TIME: 3:27 PM Court reconvenes with the jury and counsel for both parties present. Mr. 
Ferre cross examines the witness. 
TIME: 3:45 PM Exhibit 34 is marked, identified and received. 
TIME: 4:02 PM Ms. Reyes cross examines the witness. 
TIME: 4:13 PM Mr. Millard redirects the witness. 
TIME: 4:27 PM Witness is excused. 
TIME: 4:29 PM Austin Liley is sworn in and directed by Mr. Millard. 
TIME: 4:42 PM Mr. Strickland Lenart cross examines the witness. 
TIME: 4:46 PM Exhibit 43 is marked, identified and received. 
TIME: 4:48 PM Ms. Reyes cross examines the witness. 
TIME: 4:52 PM Mr. Millard redirects the witness. 
TIME: 4:53 PM Witness is excused. 
TIME: 4:54 PM Court in recess. Jurors are instructed and admonished to be present 
tomorrow morning at 8:30 am. 
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S. Brook Millard (#7415) 
WRONA GoanoN & DuB01s, P.C. 
11650 South State Street, Suite 103 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Telephone: (801) 676-5252 
Facsimile: (801) 676-5262 
Email: millard@wgdlawfirm.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
;1(~':.~ ~~ ..... -·~-~t-1 ~ 
The Order of Court is stated below: / i:~.~:-t.\ \ 
Dated: March 20, 2015 Isl JENNJfE~;~gQ\V:N 
03:30:51 PM Distric~f~@~~~b.} 
,; ~'1))7}'.'y~~-~~~ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICK LILEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. JUDGI\1ENT ON JURY VERDICT 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF Case No. 120600012 
TRANSPORTATION, a division of the State 
of Utah, nJAB COUNTY, a political Judge Jennifer A. Brown 
subdivision of the State of Utah, SANPETE 
COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State 
of Utah, CEDAR SPRINGS RANCH, INC., a 
Utah corporation, and DALE DORIUS, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
A Trial was held on this matter beginning on March 3, 2015 and ending March 5, 2015, 
the Honorab]e Jennifer A. Brown, Fourth Judicial District Court Judge, presiding. A jury of eight 
(8) persons was regularly impanelled and sworn/acknowledged to try the cause. 
Witnesses were sworn and testified. 
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After hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel, the jury was duly instructed by the 
Court, and the cause was submitted to the jury with directions to return a special verdict fonn. 
The jury deliberated and thereafter returned with its special verdict form, signed by the jury· 
foreperson, which verdict provided the following answers: 
"YES" to the question: "Was Cedar Springs Ranch Inc. at fault?"; 
"YES" to the question: "Was Cedar Springs Ranch, Inc.'s fault a cause of Patrick Li1ey's 
harm?"; 
''NO'' to the question: "Was Wann Creek Ranch, Inc. at fault?"; 
"YES" to the question: "Was Patrick Liley at fault?"; 
"YES" t? the question: "Was Patrick Liley's fault a cause of his own hann?"; 
"85%" to the question: "Wha~ percent of the fault that caused Patrick Liley's harm is 
attributable to Cedar Springs Ranch?"; 
"0%" to the question: "What percent of the fault that caused Patrick Liley's hann is 
attributable to Warm Creek Ranch?"; 
"15%" to the question: "What percent of the fault that caused Patrick Liley's harm is 
attributable to Patrick Liley?''; 
"$35,000" to the question "What amount fairly compensates Patrick Liley for Past 
Medical Expenses?"; 
"$0" to the question "What amount fairly compensates Patrick Liley for Other Economic 
Damages?"; 
"$269,940" to the question "What amount fairly compensates Patrick Liley for Non-
2 
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Economic Damages?"; 
The jury then totaled the amount awarded to fairly compensate Patrick Liley in the 
amount of $304,940. 
It appearing by reason of said special verdict form that Plaintiff Patrick Liley is entitled 
to judgment against Defendant Cedar Springs Ranch, Inc., now therefore, the Court hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
1. The Plaintiffs award of damages sha11 be reduced by 15% which is the percentage of 
fault assigned to him by the jury. 
2. The Plaintiff will have and recover a net amount of $259,199.00 dollars from 
Defendant Cedar Springs, Inc. 
3. The Plaintiff will have and shall be entitled to recover his costs of suit. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this the __ day of _______ _, 2015. 
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BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Jennifer A. Brown 
Fourth Judicial District Court Judge 
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